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PREFACE 
Accounting was, and to large extent is, traditionally 
viewed in the context of an income measurement model. 
More recently, emphasis has been placed upon accounting as 
a decision-facilitating tool. As a result, accounting is 
viewed increasingly in the context of a decision maker 
using some (specified) prediction and decision models. 
This research is··a natural extension of this latt~r 
approach. Specifically, accounting information is examined 
as it functions to provide explanation of relevant events 
such that the decision maker is provided with the knowledge 
requisite to a rational decision. The essential question 
is whether accounting should b~ viewed as, in some sense, 
unique, or as simply another case of a discipline seeking 
to provide useful explanation of events in its accepted 
domain of inquiry. This research takes the latter and 
broader approach. In large part this study holds as its 
task the development of a context that is useful for ex-
amining the many and varied approaches to accounting "theo--
rizing." 
I wish to express my appreciation to my major adviser, 
Dr. Milton Usry, for his guidance throughout this research. 
I also wish to thank two other committee members Dr. Elba 
iii 
Baskin and Dr. Joseph Jadlow. Special thanks is due 
to Professor John Bosworth for his extremely valuable 
comments on both substance and form. FinalJ.y, I wish to 
thank Ms. Cindy Stofleth for her accuracy and timeliness 
in typing earlier drafts of this manuscript and I extend 
my appreciation to Mrs. Elizabeth Schuttler for her efforts 
in the preparation of the final manuscript. 
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CHAPTER I 
RESEARCH TOPIC, METHODOLOGY, 
AND ORGANIZATION 
Introduction 
Accounting is recognized as a discipline which derives 
its justification, in part at least, through the provision 
of information to decision makers. Stated in another way, 
the accounting discipline concerns itself with methods that 
can be employed to make various parties more knowledgeable 
than they would be without those methods or procedures. 
Clearly, the characterization of a discipline as being con-
cerned with the provisions of knowledge or information that 
will allow reasoned actions is equally applicable to all 
intellectual disciplines, whether it be one of the physical 
sciences, medicine, sociology, psychology, or economics. 
In this respect, then, accounting shares with those dis-
ciplines an interest in such questions as: 11What are the 
basic features or requirements of adequate knowledge?" and 
11 What are the implications of these requirements for a 
discipline seeking to gain and transmit such knowledge?" 
Since it is generally recognized that science, 
especially the natural sciences, has built an impressive 
1 
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edifice of knowledge, the concern with epistemic aspects of 
accounting leads quite naturally to the query, "Can account-
ing be a science?" However, that question, as stated, pro-
vides no direction to a researcher. Indeed, the awarding 
or withholding of the distinguished title of "science" is 
unimportant. However, due to the intellectual maturity of. 
these scientific disciplines and the availability of a clear 
analysis of the basic features of the knowledge these dis-
ciplines provide, the following question can be meaningfully 
asked: "If accounting is to provide knowledge for reasoned 
action, what are the necessary, fundamental features of that 
knowledge?" 
The Research Question and Methodology 
In large part, understanding any research question 
demands understanding the tools used to analyze that 
question. Furthermore, to make the present question--What 
are the epistemic requirements of accounting information in 
its role of aiding reasoned action?--amenable to analysis, 
it is necessary to specify clearly those aspects of the 
actor and those functions of the accounting system which are 
viewed as fundamental. In other words, certain simplifying 
assumptions are necessary, and reader awareness of these 
assumptions is essential to an understanding of the research 
question. At this point, the research question is given very 
succinct statement, while the remainder of this section pro-
vides a closer examination of the research tool and the 
3 
simplifying assumptions used in this research. 
The research question is as follows: Under the ana-
lytical technique of logical empiricists and with accounting 
viewed as a language, what are the necessary syntactical and 
semantical features of accounting information in its role of 
providing information to a rational actor? In other words, 
the methodology of this research involves the technique of 
logical empiricism, accounting is viewed as an informative 
(knowledge providing) language, and the user of that infor-
mation is characterized as rational. Also, it must be noted 
that in order to provide a more precise characterization of 
accounting systems,the paradigm of the 1971 AAA Committee on 
Theory Construction1 is accepted and two functions of 
accounting--planning and control--are recognized. The next 
task is to clarify, at a preliminary level, each element of 
the research question. 
Accounting's Informative Function 
In order for accounting to be informative, it is 
necessary that accounting statements provide an explanation 
of something or provide inputs to an explanatory system. 
In its informational capacity, accounting must do more than 
merely describe. In order to inform or explain, accounting 
data must be consciously selected as input to a system 
1 
''Report of the Committee on Accounting Theory Con-
struction and Verification," The Accounting Review, 
Supplement to Vol. XLVI (1971), pp. 51-79. 
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maintaining a connection between that data and some other 
phenomena. This connectiveness is the basis of explanation; 
it is the essence of knowledge. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine accounting as 
meaningfully informational without such an interpretation. 
In the words of John Dewey: 
To assume that anything can be known in isolation 
from its connections with other things is to identify 
knowing with merely having some object before per-
ception or in feeling, and is thus to lose the key 
traits that distinguish an object as known. It is 
futile, even silly, to suppose some quality that is 
directiy present constitutes the whole of the thing 
presenting the quality. . The more connections 
and interactions we ascertain, the more we ~ the 
~bject in question.2 
Thus, if accounting purports to provide knowledge or infor-
mation about some objects, events, or states of affairs, 
accounting statements must reveal the connections of the 
reported phenomena with some. other phenomena. For economy, 
it will no longer be stated, but should be understood, that 
rather than providing the explanation outright, accounting 
may instead provide inputs to such explanatory systems. 
The Function of Accounting in 
Decision Processes 
This research accepts the paradigm of the 1971 AAA 
Committee on Theory Construction. That committee has 
provided the most complete and articulate statement of the 
2 . John Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty," The Age of 
Analysis, ed. M. G. White (Boston, 1955), pp. 177-178. 
function of accounting in the context of those decision 
processes which facilitate reasoned action. This is the 
justification for accepting their work as the initial 
framework for the analysis of accounting explanation. 
The committee divides the decision process into three 
functions--data collection, prediction, and choice--which 
correspond to the three elements of the process--accounting 
models, prediction models, and decision models. Accounting 
systems are viewed as making observations on the empirical 
world according to the rules of the accounting model. 
These observations, after being encoded in the form of 
accounting statements, are the inputs to prediction models. 
Then, the outputs of prediction models serve as inputs to 
decision models, where final choice is effected. 
At this point only a few points must be made. First, 
accounting systems are viewed as providing links between 
observational data and prediction models. Secondly, 
prediction models provide a means for connecting accounting 
data to other phenomena; prediction models are explanatory 
systems. Thirdly, decision models allow the decision 
5 
maker to choose among alternatives specified by prediction 
models; decision models represent the system of values held 
by the decision maker. 
Rational Actions 
Accounting is viewed as functioning to facilitate the 
decision process. Thus, in order to specify clearly the 
6 
fundamental function of accounting which is subject to 
analysis, it is necessary to characterize the decision 
process. To accomplish the characterization of the 
decision process, the concept of "rational action" is 
developed. 
Basically, a rational actor is one who chooses among 
alternative courses of action on the basis of factual con-
nections among phenomena. Thus, the function of accounting, 
relative to this rational actor, is to provide information 
which reveals those connections. Thus, accounting 
statements must provide explanations, as developed earlier, 
if accounting is to be useful to the rational actor. 
The sources for the characterization of rational 
actions include Talcott Parsons' The Structure of Social 
Action and Talcott Parsons' and Edward Shils' Toward a 
General Theory of Action. 3 The reason for choosing this 
conception of action, which provides a scheme for defining 
rational actions, is twofold. First, the theory provides a 
generalized theory of action at a level of abstraction ap-
propriate to this research. Second, the theory apparently 
represents the theory accepted, implicitly at least, by 
most social scientists concerned with individual choice. 
Indeed, in The Structure of Social Actions, Talcott 
3 Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New 
York, 1937); and Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward 
a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1951). 
Parsons accepts Vilfredo Pareto's analysis of economic 
rationality. In Parsons' words: 
From this it seems legitimate to conclud~, either 
that the course Pareto took in defining the status 
of economic theory was wrong and an entirely 
different basis must be found or that it is 
necessary to proceed from his position, which 
involves only one positively defined analytical 
science of action, to the construction of a coherent 
system of the analytic sciences of action •.•• 
[The] economic element of Pareto's treatment has a 
definite place in the wider scheme of elements of 
action here developed. • . • This study is 
naturally definitely committed to Pareto's view of 
the status of economics.4 
In short, a specification of the nature of rational 
actions will allow the characterization of the decision 
process in a larger context and will make clear the 
functions and attributes of accounting information that 
are to be subjected to analysis. 
Types of Explanation in Accounting 
This research recognizes accounting as functioning 
in two ways or as providing two types of explanation, viz., 
planning and control. Others emphasize these aspects as 
portions of a cycle under the rubric of feedforward and 
5 feedback. In any case, these aspects are ostensibly 
different in some way. 
4 Parsons, Structure, p. 766. 
5Joel Demski, "Decision-Performance Control," The 
Accounting Review, XLIV (1969), pp. 669-678. 
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Figure 1 provides a schematic of the conceptual 
difference between planning and control maintained by this 
research. Notice the representation of two planes--the 
structured and the realized. Planning takes place on the 
structured plane, while actions take place on the realized 
plane. Accounting feeds communications forward to the 
realized state (State0 ) in the form of directives (These 
may, of course, be self directives.), it monitors the 
realized plane, and finally, it feeds back communications 
about the realized state (State1 ). The feedforward is 
planning information; feedback is control information. 
Realized State0 Actions State1 
Plane 
'0 
~ 4:1 ~qy 
.c., I (} 0'/ Time 9-yOJ 
-§ 
'0; 0 
0 Plans 4,0/ Structured 4:.,0/ 
Plane so l 
Figure 1. Conceptual Difference Between 
Planning and Control 
It should be clear that the feedforward cannot take 
> 
place without some initial informational inputs. Moreover, 
8 
since the feedback does not represent an end of the process, 
that feedback must be the initial informational inputs. 
Thus, separation of accounting explanations into planning 
9 
and control must, in a sense, be artificial. Nevertheless, 
an intelligible discussion must make use of this dichotomiz-
ing approach. And this is precisely the approach used here. 
Indeed, this research is sectioned along these lines. 
It is argued in this study that the planning-control 
distinction can be supported by reference to the explanatory 
function of accounting. The argument follows. 
On the structured plane, accounting explanations are 
prediction and decision model-based (directives) and provide 
partial answers to the question, "How can I achieve my 
goals?" On the realized plane, accounting explanations, 
though potentially directive insofar as they provide initial 
inputs to the structured plane, are in response to the 
question, "Why did I deviate from my plan of action?" On 
the structured plane, explanations have a clear future 
reference, while on the realized plane, explanations have, 
initially at least, a historical reference. 
The schematic given below should make the distinction 
clear. A rational actor has developed a plan which is 
labeled in the diagram a "rational action path." These 
plans of action are the results of explanation on the 
structured plane. Explanation on this plane is assumed to 
operate in light of completely specified prediction and 
decision models. 
Purposeful 
Agent Rational Action Path ) 
Time-----?-
10 
On the realized plane, however, there will be de-
viations from the rational action path. This is the justi-
fication for control or monitoring systems. The situation 
is diagrammed below. The actor finds events proceeding 
along the "actual action path." Before corrections of de-
viations from the rational action path can be effected, 
there must be knowledge of why the deviations occurred. 
There is an initial emphasis on historical analysis or 
explanation. Corrections of deviations are the results of 
explanation·on the realized plane, which is characterized by 
incompletely specified prediction and decision models. 
Purposeful 
Agent 
Time 
Goal or 
End 
This difference between the structured and realized 
plane--viz., complete specification of prediction and de-
cision models in the first case, incomplete specification 
in the second--raises the cogent possibility that planning 
and control explanations may differ. In other words, the 
planning-control distinction may not be artificial; the 
distinction may be justified along logical and pragmatic 
grounds. 
Logical Empiricism 
The technique which is used in this research to analyze 
the accounting language in its planning and control 
functions has been developed by those philosophers of 
science known as "logical empiricists." Their method of 
analysis involves precisely what this research holds out 
ll 
as its primary task, viz., the explication of the syn-
tactical and semantical features of explanation in an 
accounting context. The choice of this method of analysis 
allows one to respond to the vague question, "Can accounting 
be a science?", after first rephrasing the question as, 
"Can accounting fit the logical empiricist's paradigm of 
scientific explanation?" Of course, showing that accounting 
explanation can fit that paradigm does not show that ac-
counting can be a science; but, it does show that certain 
necessary conditions of scientific explanation are met, 
whose absence would prevent such an achievement. 
The position of logical empiricism maintains a 
dichotomy--the purely formal sciences of logic and mathe-
matics on one hand and the factual sciences of nature and 
society on the other. Its analysis of these factual or 
empirical sciences, the analysis of interest to this 
research, involves the explication of the logical structure 
and empirical confirmation in these sciences. Thus the 
name, "logical empiricism." 
In order to understand the technique of analysis used 
by logical empiricists, one must first be aware of the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences and 
between a priori and~ posteriori validity. Analytic 
12 
sentences are true by definition, while the truth of syn-
thetic sentences is contingent upon experimential evidence. 
A priori validity is logically independent of experience, 
while.§!: posteriori validity is dependent upon experience. 
Figure 2 reveals the combinations of sentence types 
and validity bases which are considered legitimate by logi-· 
~al empiricists. The allowed combinations are as follows: 
1. The~ priori and analytic. For example, the 
statement, "All bachelors are males," is known to be valid 
independent ·of experience (.§!;priori), since the statement 
is predicated by a term, the meaning of which is part of 
the meaning of the subject (analytic). 
2. The a posteriori and synthetic. For example, the 
statement, "All bachelors are eccentrics," has a validity 
which is dependent upon experience (a posteriori} since the 
Sentence Types 
Analytic Synthetic 
(True by definition) (Factual) 
A priori Formal logic, Illegitimate 
(independent JVIathematics 
of experience) Validity 
Bases A posteriori Contradictory Empirical 
(dependent on (logically Sciences 
experience) inconsistent) 
Figure 2. Legitimate Combinations of'Sentence 
Types and Validity Bases 
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statement is predicated by a term, the meaning of which 
is not subsumed by the subject (synthetic). 
The other two combinations, ~ priori synthetic and 
a posteriori analytic, are held to be illegitimate com-
binations. One cannot have a statement which is factual 
(synthetic) and yet verified by means logically independent 
of experience (~priori). Nor can one have a statement, 
the validity of which is dependent upon experience (~ 
posteriori) and yet is true by definition (analytic). 6 
The above discussion renders clear the following 
description of the empiricist's method. In the analysis 
of empirical knowledge, one relies upon a bifurcation 
analogous to the dichotomy of pure logic and factual 
sciences. First, the analytic structure and the a priori 
validity of scientific knowledge can be analyzed. This 
analysis involves the study of syntax and logical validity. 
Second, the means by which these structures are connected 
to synthetic ~ posteriori statements of the empirical 
sciences is subject to study. This is the investigation of 
semantics and empirical confirmation. 7 
6 The definitions may be empirically based; but, for 
one accepting the definitions, the validity of an analytic 
statement requires no recourse to observation. However, 
a systematic collection of statements may be analytic and 
yet be connected to a synthetic ~posteriori proposition. 
This renders the theoretical system meaningful. 
7 The preceding discussion relied heavily upon Herbert 
Feigel, "Logical Empiricism," Readin~s in Philosophical 
Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigel and Wil ria-Sellars (New York, 
1949, pp. 3-26; and Rudolf Carnap, "Philosophy and Logical 
Syntax," The Age of Analysis, ed. M. G. White (Boston, 
1955), pp. 203-225. 
Objectives 
Objectives and Organization 
of the Research 
The objectives of this research can be stated in 
terms of the research question: Under the method of 
semiotics (the technique of logical empiricists) and with 
accounting viewed as a language, what are the necessary 
syntactical and semantical features of an accounting model 
in its function of facilitating rational actions? More-
over, the planning-control distinction is recognized as a 
potential source for divergent answers to the research 
question. Thus, the research is appropriately sectioned 
along these lines. 
Organization 
In Chapter II, this research examines the position of 
logical ernpircists. First, an analysis of the technique 
of semiotics will be provided. Following the description 
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of semiotics, deductive systems will be analyzed using that 
technique. The purpose of Chapter II is to specify the tool 
of analysis to be used in this research, as well as eluci-
date the paradigm of scientific explanation maintained by 
logical empiricists. 
In Chapter III the concept of rational action will be 
developed. As previously pointed out, the purpose of 
specifying the decision-maker-type is to reveal clearly 
which functions of accounting are to be analyzed by the 
technique of semiotics. At this point, then, the method-
ological tool will have been specified, a paradigm of 
explanation will have been provided, and the precise 
functions of accounting explanation which are to be 
analyzed will have been identified. 
Chapter IV will present an analysis of accounting 
explanation in the context of the theory of action with 
respect to the structured plane. First, the 1971 
Committee's view and the concept of rational action will 
be coordinated. Then an analysis of the logical structure 
and semantical features of accountirig explanation on the 
structured plane will be provided. In this chapter it is 
assumed that a fully articulated deductive system is 
available for the purpose of explanation. Thus, this 
chapter examines the necessary syntactical and semantical 
features of accounting explanation assuming that the 
paradigm of the logical empiricists holds. As a result, 
a precise characterization of accounting, prediction, and 
decision models is given. In a certain sense, then, 
Chapter IV provides a coordination of Chapters II and III. 
15 
Chapter V provides a critical examination of the 
assumption that the traits of adequate explanation main-
tained by the logical empiricists is necessary to accounting 
explanation. This critical analysis is effected by 
examining accounting explanation on the realized plane, 
i.e., accounting control explanation. It is no longer 
assumed that fully articulated deductive systems are 
available for explanatory purposes. Thus, the question 
arises--"What paradigm of explanation is necessary 
relative to a rational actor?" 
The approach taken in Chapter V begins with an expli-
cation of the logical empiricists' paradigm of historical 
explanation, since, as previously pointed out, control 
explanation are intitially in response to a need to 
analyze the causes of past deviations from planned actions. 
Then, the suitability of this paradigm with respect to 
accounting control explanation is examined. Finally, 
Chapter VI provides a summary of this research. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEDUCTIVE SYSTEMS IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCES 
The Method of Analysis--An Investigation 
of Language 
Introduction 
The method of analysis used in this research is termed 
"semiotics." This is the approach of that group of 
philosophers known as logical empiricists. Essentially 
the approach involves an analysis of the logical structure 
and empirical requirements of scientific knowledge. Inas-
much as it is the purpose of this research to investigate 
the characteristics of a cognitively oriented accounting 
language, the reason for the choice of the semiotic method 
of analysis becomes clear. In order to provide a systematic 
approach to the investigation of the language of accounting 
as it operates to facilitate objectively reasoned action, 
one must adopt an analytical tool that can reveal the 
logical (reasoned) and empirical (objective) requirements 
of such a language. The method of semiotics provides such 
a tool. 
The first section of this chapter examines the method 
of semiotics; the next section examines deductive systems 
17 
using that method. The reason for examining deductive 
systems is simply that accounting systems are initially 
viewed as structurally consistent with such systems. At 
a later point this assumption is critically examined. 
Metalanguage and Object Language 
18 
Semiotics involves the analysis of language. However, 
the study of the actual language of science would include 
the analysis of our natural language, English. Owing to 
the ambiguity of the English language, semantical and syn-
tactical investigations (two of the three aspects of 
semiotics; the other is pragmatics) are generally conducted 
on an artificial language. Languages to be investigated 
are called "object languages." 
In order to speak about the object language, one must 
use some other language. This "metalanguage" is usually 
English, while the object language is usually symbolic 
logic. Symbolic logic. is chosen due to its univocality 
and precision. In other words, operations within symbolic 
logic are both agreed upon and definite. 
For example, consider the connective "or". In 
English this term is ambiguous--the term can be used in 
either the exclusive or inclusive sense. In English the 
sentence "A or B" can be evaluated as (1) "A or B, but 
not both" or as (2) "A orB or both." The first evalu-
ation is in the exclusive sense; the latter is inclusive. 
On the other hand, the term "or" in symbolic logic is 
usually designated in the inclusive sense. If either both 
or at least one of the two expressions joined by the con-
nective "or" is true, then the entire disjunction is true; 
otherwise, the disjunction is false. 1 
The procedure of adopting a precise object language 
and analyzing the semantical and syntactical aspects of 
that language through a metalanguage is termed "rational 
construction" (or "reconstruction" if a portion of some 
body of scientific knowledge is under investigation). The 
procedure avoids many of the ambiguities that would be 
inherent in studying the actual language of science. It 
allows the demonstration of principles which would other-
19 
wise be hidden in a mass of complexity. Logical empiricists 
have found rational reconstruction an invaluable technique. 
Semiotics 
Semiotics is the study of languages. As practiced by 
logical empiricists it often involves the creation of an 
artificial language, the object language. Semiotics views 
language as comprised of three dimensions--syntactics, 
semantics, and pragmatics. 
Syntax is the relation of language signs to language 
signs. It is the province of formal logic. Semantics is 
the study of the relation of language signs to the things 
1Alfred Tarski, Introduction to Logic and to the 
Methodology of Deductive Sciences,~r. Olaf Helmer (3rd 
ed., New York, 1965), pp. 21-23. 
designated by those signs. Empirical scientific systems 
must have a semantical system. Indeed, any communicative 
effort must involve some semantical system; otherwise, the 
communication would be meaningless, i.e., without refer-
ence. Pragmatics is the study of the relation of signs to 
users. This research considers pragmatic aspects when the 
uses and requirements of accounting statements are con-
sidered! Syntactical and semantical aspects arise during 
the analysis of accounting as a language. A discussion of 
syntax and semantics follows. 
Syntactical analysis, the study of relations among 
2 language signs, views language as marks on paper. Of 
course, only certain marks will be allowed in any fully 
developed language. For example, in our natural language 
of English the mark ".$" is not recognized. 
In addition to rules specifying allowable marks, a 
rationally constructed language will contain certain rules 
of formation. These rules specify the ways in which the 
marks of language are to be placed in combination to form 
expressions. In English, for example, the following 
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violates accepted rules of formation: "A human? is a dog." 
Wh~le all the marks are acceptable, the placing of the 
question mark in the middle of th~ expression is a vio-
lation of syntactical rules. Notice that the "sense" of 
2obviously, more than written languages could be 
considered, e.g., facial expressions. However, only 
written languages are considered here. 
the sentence (i.e., the meaning if the question mark is 
removed) is not a violation of syntax. The sense of the 
sentence is a question of semantics. 
The other rules of a syntactical system are those of 
transformation. These rules specify the ways in which 
sentences of the language can be transformed into other 
sentences. In a deductive system this transformation 
process involves what is ordinarily called implication. 
For example, in traditional logic one can derive from the 
sentences "All A is B" and "All B is C" the sentence "All 
A is C." 3 
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Another dimension of language which is subject to study 
is semantics. Semantics involves meaning or the relation 
of language signs and expressions to things those signs and 
expressions designate. In a complete semantical system, it 
is necessary to specify other rules in addition to the ap-
propriate, adopted syntactical rules. These additional 
rules are rules of designation, truth, and ranges. The 
method of semantical analysis considered here is due 
4 primarily to Rudolph Carnap. 
Rules of designation specify what object or event is 
referred to by the referential expressions of the language 
3The above section relied heavily upon Rudolf Carnap, 
Introduction to Semantics and Formalization of Logic 
(Cambridge, 1959); and Andreas G. Papandreou, Economics 
as a Science (New York, 1958). 
4Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, ~ Stu)y in 
Semantics and Modal Logic (2nd ed., Chicago, 1956 . 
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under question. For instance, these rules might include 
"'s' is a symbol for 'Socrates"' and "'H' is a symbol for 
'human'." Note for future reference that 's' is an 
individual constant and 1 H1 is a predicate of the object 
language, while " 1 s'" and " 1 H 1 " are symbols of the 
metalanguage for 1 s 1 and 'H', respectively. 
Rules of truth specify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the specification of a sentence as true. An 
example of a rule of truth for atomic sentences follows: 
The (symbolic) sentence 'Hs' is true if and only if the 
thing designated by 's' has the property designated by 'H'. 
Of course, the designates are determined by the semantical 
system's rules of designation. This is sometimes called the 
5 
"correspondence theory" of truth. 
The other rules of the semantical system are the rules 
of ranges. These rules, which are extremely important to 
the understanding of the method of semantical analysis under 
consideratlon, determine whether a sentence of a particular 
semantical system, S., holds in a given "state description." 
l 
A state description is formed from the class of all atomic 
sentences (sentences comprised of a predicate followed by 
any number of individual constants) of S.. A particular 
l 
state description is formed as follows: For every atomic 
5Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and. 
the Foundations of Semantics," Readings in Philosophical 
Anal)sis, ed. Herbert Feigel and Wilfrid Sellars (New York, 
1949 ' p. 54. 
sentence of S. either the sentence or the negation of the 
l 
sentence, but not both, is designated. A particular state 
description gives one of many complete descriptions of the 
universe of discourse of Si. 
Now, a sentence holds in a state description if that 
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sentence would be true if that state description were true. 
A rule of range for atomic sentences would, then, be that 
"an atomic sentence holds in a given state description if 
and only if the sentence belongs to (is included in) that 
state description. 116 Rules of ranges for other designators 
(all expressions to which semantical analysis is applied) 
can be similarly given. They are, however, not of interest 
to this research. 
Up to this point, then, there are syntactical rules 
specifying allowable signs, combination of signs (ex-
pressions), and transformation of expressions. The 
semantical system, using an appropriate syntax, determines 
the designation of expressions, rules of truth, and rules 
of ranges. At this point the important distinction 
between analytic and synthetic sentences is drawn. 
Utilizing in particular the concepts of rules of desig-
nation and rules of ranges, an analytic sentence is defined 
as one that is "L-true." A sentence is L-true (logically 
true) in Si if and only if that sentence holds in every 
state description. Notice that if a sentence holds in 
6 Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 9. 
every state description, it must hold in the true state 
description. (Remember that possible state descriptions 
are limited to the universe of discourse of the particular 
semantical system, S., under consideration.) 
l 
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For example, 1Hs 1 (i.e., 'Socrates is human') holds in 
some state descriptions. t -Hs 1 (i.e. , 1 Socrates is not 
human') holds in all others. Thus, 'Hs V""Hs' (i.e., 'Hs 
or ..vHs 1 ) holds in all state descriptions and thus is L-true 
or analytic. But the sentence 1 Hs 1 does not hold in all 
state descriptions, viz., those descriptions including 
1 ,wHs'. Thus 'Hs' is synthetic or factual. Only an empiri-
cal investigation of, say, records stating that Socrates was 
human would suffice to determine the truth of 1 Hs 1 in fact. 
Another way of viewing analyticity can be given. 
Analytic sentences can be shown to be true merely on the 
basis of meaning. If the semantical rules alone suffice to 
determine the truth of a sentence, that sentence is ana-
lytic. However, if one has to make extralinguistic investi-
gations, then the sentence is factual or synthetic. (In 
other words, the sentence is "F-determinate" or factually 
true or false.) 
Given the concept of logical truth (L-truth), one can 
examine the concepts of intension and extension. These 
latter concepts are important later in this research 
(Chapter IV) when questions about the empirical requirements 
of accounting language arise. However, it is most con-
venient to introduce these concepts now. 
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First, consider the concepts of L-equivalence and 
F-equivalence (i.e., logical and factual equivalence). 
Equivalence (symbolically written as 1 .:01 ) expresses mutual 
implication. For example, "If X then Y and if Y then X" 
or, stated another way, "X if and only if Y" or, yet 
another way, "X = Y" express mutual implication. 
Two sentences,. 'A.' and 'A.', are L-equivalent if and 
l J 
only if the sentence 'A. ~A.' is L-true. In other words, 
l J 
1 A. 1 is L-equivalent to 'A.' if and only if 'A.' and 'A.' 
l J l J 
hold in the same state descriptions. F-equivalence is 
defined as follows: 'A.' is F-equivalent to 'A.' if and 
l J 
only if 'A. ~A.' is F-true (i.e., not L-true, but true in 
l J 
fact). 7 If two sentences are L-equivalent, this can be 
discovered on the basis of semantical rules alone; if they 
are F-equivalent, only an empirical investigation will 
reveal the equivalence. 
Notice that there are two types or kinds of equiva-
lence for sentences. It appears, then, that sentences 
(and, more generally, any expressions) must involve some 
sort of dual aspects or features. These aspects are labeled 
"intension" and ••extension." Before becoming formal, how-
ever the concepts of intension and extension are examined 
at a preliminary level. 
In the case of predicates (e.g., "blue," "hard," 
"harder than"), extension refers to classes while intension 
7 Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 11. 
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refers to properties. For example, the sentence 1 Hs 1 
can be translated as "Socrates is a member of the class 
human" or as "Socrates has the property of being human." 
Intension, then, deals with the meaning or sense of an 
expression, while extension refers to the scope of predi-
cation. Intensions are determined by the semantical system; 
Extensions are in general determined by factual inquiries. 
This leads to the following formal definitions: "Two 
designators [predicates, individual constants, sentences] 
have the same extension (in s1 ) = df they are equivalent 
(in s1 )," and "Two designators have the same intension 
(in s1 ) = df they are L-equivalent (in s1 )."8 
Notice that equivalence can be either F-equivalence or 
L-equivalence. Two predicates, for example, would have the 
same extension if they are F-equivalent. Moreover, they 
have the same intension if and only if they are L-equiva-
lent. The identicality of intensions is a semantical 
question. In general,. then, an identicality of classes due 
to F-equivalence corresponds to any number of properties or 
intensions. However, any property uniquely determines 
some class. 
To illustrate the above, consider the predicates 
"human," "rational animal," and "featherless biped." Now, 
if the semantical system stipulates that "human" ( 1 H 1 ) and 
"rational animal" ( 1 RA 1 ) have the same or identical meaning, 
8Ibid. , p. 23. The symbols " = df " is read "means by 
definition that." 
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then 'H' is L-equivalent to 'RA' and the sentence 'Hs - RAs' 
(i.e. 'Socrates is human is equivalent to Socrates is a 
rational animal') is L-true. Also, the class "human" and 
the class "rational animals" would be identical. Semanti-
cal analysis is sufficient to demonstrate the identicality. 
But, without specification to the contrary, the 
sentence 'Hs: (F·B)s' (i.e. 'Socrates is human is equiva-
lent to Socrates is a featherless biped') is F-true. That 
the class "human" and the class "featherless biped" are 
identical is a factual question since there is no identity 
of intension expressed by the semantical system between 
"human" and "featherless biped." 
The purpose of working through this rather technical 
discussion is now suggested. Full elaboration is reserved 
for Chapter IV. The question to be reckoned with is what 
parts of an accounting system correspond to the semantical 
system which specifies meaning. At this point it is merely 
noted that the signals from an accounting system must be 
viewed as encompassing some immediate semantical system; 
otherwise, the problem of what sense or meaning is to be 
attached to the signals is left so open that verification 
of the signals before transmittal is problematic. In other 
words, if the signals are transmitted to users each of whom 
(or each class of whom) has different semantical systems, 
then there is a question as to what the accounting signals 
refer. This may seem extremely obvious. But those who, 
for example, advocate general (multi-) purpose statements 
seem to be committed to potentially different interpre-
tations of the signals of accounting. How, then, can the 
signals be considered semantically true prior to trans-
mittal, if that to which signals refer is not even speci-
fied? At any rate, all of this is left to a later point. 
A further elaboration is given in the summary to this 
chapter. 
Introduction 
An Analysis of Deductive Systems 
in Empirical Sciences 
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This section discusses deductive systems in the empiri-
cal sciences. It should be noted that the system as 
characterized does not necessarily have an exact counterpart 
in the systems used by natural and social scientists in 
their accounts of natural or social phenomena. Instead, 
the discussion relies on rational reconstruction, a system 
wherein all semantical and syntactical aspects of the object 
language are ruled. Such a procedure recommends itself due 
to its fruitfulness and avoidance of unnecessary compli-
cations. 
The discussion of deductive systems uses the method of 
semotic analysis. Deductive systems are viewed as language 
systems. As a result there is a parallel between this and 
the immediately preceding section. The first portion of the 
following examines the syntactical aspects of deductive 
systems; the second portion considers semantical aspects. 
Syntax--Theoretical Terms and the Calculus 
First one must make the distinction between a theory, 
T, and a metatheory, M. The metatheory has the theory (or 
deductive system) as its subject matter. This distinction 
corresponds to the earlier contrast between object language 
and metalanguage. Within the metatheory one can make the 
I 
further distinction of the structure of T and the refer-
ential function of T. The structure of T is governed by 
the syntactical rules of M, while the referential function 
of T is ruled by the semantical rules of M. Most existing 
deductive systems of science do not specify the syntactical 
and semantical rules, although such rules do obtain. 9 
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Next in order is a discussion of the structural aspects 
of T. The syntactical rules of T (found in M) would in-
elude the three types of rules examined earlier, viz., rules 
of enumeration and classification of the signs of T, of 
formation, and of transformation. 
The signs of T can be classified as logical or 
descriptive. These signs can in turn be classified as 
either constants or variables. Among the logical constants 
would be such terms as "and", "or", and "implies." In 
short, the logical signs would be (most of) the symbols 
9J. H. Woodger, "The Technique of Theory Construction," 
Foundations of the Unity of Science: Toward an Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, ed. 
Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles Morris (Chicago, 
1970)' p. 456. 
f f l l . 10 o orma ogle. 
Among the descriptive constants in the syntactical 
portion ofT are the primitive terms. These primitive 
terms are undefined in the syntax of T. All other extra-
logical (descriptive) terms are derived from the primitive 
terms. In an axiomatic or deductive system, primitive 
terms are used to form postulates or axioms or primitive 
sentences from which all other sentences are derived. 11 
(The way in which primitive terms and sentences, and 
derivative terms and sentences obtain empirical import is 
a question of semantics. Accordingly, that question is 
considered in the following section.) 
Examples of primitive terms from classical physics 
would be the terms "force" and "motion;" from economics 
would be "wants" and "goods." In traditional accounting, 
primitive terms would not be "assets" or "costs" since 
-- . 
"assets" are defined as "unexpired costs." Instead, the 
primitive term is "value," since costs are· defined as 
12 
"purposeful value releases." Whether or not one agrees 
10 Woodger, pp. 458-459. 
11carl G. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma: A 
Study in the Logic of Theory Construction," Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Concepts, Theories, 
and the Mind-Body Problem, Vol. II, ed. Herbert Feigel, 
Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis, 1959), 
p. 46. 
1211 Tentative Statement of Cost Concepts Underlying 
Reports for Managerial Purpose;:;," Accounting Review, 
XXXI (1956), p. 183. 
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with the choice of primitive terms, it is clear that to 
avoid circularity some terms must be left undefined. 
Once the signs of the system have been classified and 
rules of formation have been specified, postulates or axioms 
can be formed. Then, with the rules of transformation, 
one can deduce theorems. 
An example is given at this point. In Euclidean 
geometry the primitive terms include "point," "plane" and 
"line." Axioms or postulates are posited. These satisfy 
(unspecified) rules of formation. An example of an axiom 
13 is "There is at least one line on a plane." Then, to 
every high school student's distress, from these axioms 
various theorems can be proven using (not explicitly 
stated) rules of transformation. 
Notice that interpretation has been given to neither 
the primitive terms nor the system as a whole. So far all 
one has are signs (logical and extralogical), rules of 
formation, and rules of transformation. While everyone 
may imagine "points" as very small dots on a piece of paper, 
such imagining is unnecessary to the proof of theorems, 
i.e., to operations within the syntactical structure of 
14 the theory. 
13 . 
Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, "The Nature of a 
Logical or Mathematical System," Readings in the Philoso-
EbY of Science, ed. Herbert Feigel and May Brodbeck 
(New Yorki 1953)~ p. 133. 
14 Cohen and Nagel, p. 133. 
The following summarizes the discussion thus far. 
The "theoretical" portion of a deductive system can be 
viewed as a calculus, i.e., as signs and ruled operations 
on signs. There is no reference to objects of the empiri-
cal world. Examples of theoretical terms from economics 
are "pure competition," "perfect markets," and "utility." 
Operations within this portion of the deductive system 
require no recourse to observation; this is clear to 
anyone who has found generalized equilibrium equations 
in a Keynesian system. However, if these systems are to 
have application and testing, there must be some sort of 
connection to observables. For instance, in Keynes' 
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system one needs to know the coefficient of the propensity 
to consume if one is to test or apply that system empiri-
cally. We now turn to a consideration of these connections 
and the language of observables. 
Semantics--Observation Terms and 
Interpretation of the Calculus 
If the theoretical, syntactical structure is to have 
empirical import, then that calculus must be connected 
to observational terms. Or, as it is sometimes put, the 
syntactical structure needs an empirical interpretation. 
These connections to the observable world are effected 
by means of a semantical system specified by the meta-
theory. The semantical system specifies descriptive signs. 
The descriptive constants are observational terms such as, 
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for example, "red" and "currency." The descriptive 
variables are place-holders for such constants. 
These observational terms have a more or less direct 
empirical reference. Under the logical empiricists method, 
when one speaks of a "blue" object, the quality "blue" is 
. 15 
spoken of, not "blue-perception." This is to say that 
the term "blue" has a direct link to observables. On the 
other hand, there are concepts such as "temperature" or 
"harder than." These observational terms specify operations 
that must be performed to identify the empirical property 
or relation. For example, in a hardness test, one object 
is said to be harder than another if a relatively sharp 
edge of the former will scratch the latter, but not vice-
versa. In short, observational terms are those which 
refer directly to empirical objects or which refer to 
operations with direct empirical links. 16 
In addition to specifying the descriptive signs, the 
semantical system must lay down rules of designation, 
truth, and ranges. Remember that any semantical system 
must embrace an appropriate syntax. Since semantical 
systems and their rules have already been discussed, all 
15carl Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in 
the Empirical Sciences," Foundations of the Unity of 
Science: Toward an International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, Vol. II, ed. Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and 
Charles Morris (Chicago, 1970), p. 674. 
16Herbert Feigel, "Operationism and Scientific Method," 
Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigel and 
Wilfrid Sellars (New York, 1949), pp. 448-509. 
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that is left to consider is the way in which a theoretical 
syntactical structure, which contains no terms designating 
real world objects or events, is connected to the semanti-
cal system containing observational terms. 
In order that this connection between the theoretical 
and observational can be effected, a special type of 
semantical rule is necessary. These rules are called, 
among other names, "rules of correspondence." The exact 
form of these rules is not clear. Indeed, any precise 
formulation borders on fiat specification. However, the 
general nature of these rules can be made clear. 
First, not all sentences or descriptive terms of the 
theoretical, syntactical structure are connected directly 
to observational sentences or terms. There is no one-to-one 
correspondence between theoretical and observational 
expressions. 17 Only certain theoretical concepts are 
connected to directly observable experessions. Other non-
observable, descriptive expressions receive interpretation 
or meaning in an even more indirect fashion through 
application of syntactical rules of formation and trans-
formation. 
18 The schematic in Figure 3 should be helpful. The 
17Hans Reichenbach, "The Verifiability Theory of 
Meaning," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. 
Herbert Feigel and May Brodbeck (New York, 1953), p. 95. 
18 Adapted from Henry Margenau, "What Is a Theory?" 
The Structure of Economic Science--Essays on Methodology, 
ed. Sherman Roy Krupp (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), p. 30. 
35 
theoretical sentences are related to one another by the 
rules of transformation. Note that one pair of theoretical 
sentences has the relation of mutual implication as denoted 
by the two-directional, dashed arrow. Only two of the 
theoretical sentences are connected to observational 
sentences. The other theoretical terms are more indirectl~-
interpreted. One must say "more indirectly" interpreted, 
since the form of the rules of correspondence is not 
necessarily one of, say, nominal definition or synonym. 
-~o 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
d I~ 
I 0 
\JI 
0 
® 
Theoretical 
sentences 
Observational 
sentences 
Implication (rules 
of transformation) 
Inference (rules 
of induction) 
Figure 3. Logical Relationships Among Theoretical 
and Observational Sentences 
One other characteristic of deductive systems becomes 
apparent. Not only must implication from theoretical to 
observational sentences hold, but also inference from 
observational to theoretical sentences. 19 That is, both 
deduction and induction must be encompassed by the rules 
of correspondence. This illustrated in the diagram by 
two sets of arrows from observational to theoretical 
sentences. 
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In general, the requirements of deduction are agreed 
upon. However, induction presents many unsolved problems. 
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the evidence as 
stated in observational sentences yields only a degree of 
confirmation on the propositions of theoretical structures. 
This is a statement of the familiar principle of in-
duction--no future observation need be consistent with all 
previous observations. One may be highly certain that 
future observations will follow previously experienced 
regularity; but, there is no reason to be absolutely sure. 
There is certainty only in the sense of logical necessity; 
uncertainty is a characteristic of induction. Thus con-
firmation of propositions, theoretical or empirical, is only 
one of degree. No empirical regularity can ever attain the 
status of certainty; thus, neither can any theoretical 
formulation, since such formulations rest partially on 
observational evidence. 
19Reichenbach, p. 95. 
There is one other requirement which must be met by 
any deductive system in empirical science--There must be 
confirmability or disconfirmability in principle, even if 
this (dis) confirmability is indirect. 20 This condition 
of confirmability depends upon the nature of the obser-
vational propositions of the deductive system, assuming 
that the rules of correspondence and all syntactical and 
all other semantical rules are sufficient. 
An example of a proposition which is not confirmable 
in principle is the following: "At nightfall, all things 
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double in size." There is no way imaginable to empirically 
test this proposition. On the other hand, the following 
is confirmable in principle: "If all (early) persons were 
to shut their eyes simultaneously, then the universe would 
grow dark." Of course, the latter proposition might be 
practically impossible to (dis) confirm; but, in principle, 
all one must do is, say, set up appropriate cameras and 
get everyone to close their eyes simultaneously. 
This requirement of confirmability is important for the 
following reason: If two competing theories are set forth 
and if more than logical consistency is demanded as a 
requirement for entry into scientific knowledge, then there 
must be an empirlcal basis for choosing between the two 
20Herbert Feigel, "The Mind-Body Problem in Develop-
ment of Logical Empiricism," Readings in the Philosophy of 
Science, ed. Herbert Feigel and May Brodbeck (New York, 
1953), p. 619. 
38 
theories. In other words, if the analytic validity of two 
theories is unquestioned, then the only basis for judging 
the two theories is that of synthetic confirmation. (See 
Chapter I for the logical empiricists' allowable combi-
nations of sentence and validity types.) Clearly, then, 
empirical confirmation in principle is an essential feature 
of hypotheses in empirical sciences. 
Summary and Purpose 
This section summarizes Chapter II and indicates how 
it rel.ates to subsequent chapters. 
First, the analytical method of semiotics, excluding 
pragmatics, was considered. The method of rational recon-
struction was explained. A discussion of the technique 
of syntactical and semantical analysis ,followed. Syntax 
refers to the logical structure of a language. Semantics 
is the study of the relation of language signs to their 
designata. In a rational reconstruction, all syntactical 
and semantical aspects of the object language will be ruled. 
In this chapter the particularly important concepts 
of intension and extension were introduced. Intension deals 
with the meaning or sense of an expression; extension deal~ 
with the scope or denotation of expressions. For example, 
in the case of predicates (such as "human"), the intension 
would be the specified property, while extension would be 
the corresponding class; in the case of sentences, intension 
would be the proposition expressed, while extension would 
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be the truth value. 
The intension of a sentence is specified by the 
semantical system. In other words, the proposition ex-
pressed by a sentence is determined by the semantical system 
in operation. For example, the meaning of the sentence (in 
English), "All crows are black," depends on the designata 
of the various extralogical terms. Of course, syntactical 
questions are involved, as they are in any semantical 
system. In short, the semantical system allows interpre-
tation of the sentence. 
The extension or truth value of the above example is 
a question of fact. However, before an empirical investi-
gation can be made, the sense of the sentence must be 
clear, i.e., an unambiguous senantical interpretation must 
be available. 
·Now, the truth value, "true,'' is consistent with any 
number of interpretations of "All crows are black." This 
consideration led us to the question: Can an accounting 
system be viewed as divorced from some specified semantical 
system? The provisional answer was, "no." If accounting. 
statements are to be held out as empirically correct, then 
that about which correctness is maintained must be speci-
fied. And since semantical systems specify the interpre-
tations of sentences or statements, it follows that some 
semantical system must be maintained. Otherwise, the 
correctness of accounting statements is held on faith since, 
as pointed out, multiple semantical systems lead to multiple 
interpretations and thus, in general, multiple extensions. 
In other words, as the number of interpretations increase, 
the likelihood of any accounting statement being correct 
is reduced relative to all interpretations. Similarly, 
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as "crows" and "black 11 receive additional interpretations, 
the likelihood of the statement 11 All crows are black" being. 
true is reduced. This topic is dealt with in more detail 
in Chapter IV and Chapter VI. 
Secondly, deductive systems were examined. Using 
semi otical analysis, excluding pragmatics, the charac-
teristics of the theoretical and observational portion 
of a ded0ctive system were specified. The theoretical 
portion is viewed as a calculus--signs and operations on 
signs. It involves only syntax in any direct way. The 
observational (or empirical) portion corresponds to a 
semantical system. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a partial 
foundation for the dis~ussion in Chapters· IV and V. In 
this chapter semiotics, the analytical tool used in this 
research, and deductive systems, the paradigm of scientific 
explanation maintained by logical empiricists, were 
examined. In Chapter III, the concept of rational action 
is developed. Chapter IV and V examine accounting 
explanations for planning and control, using the tool 
developed in this chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
A SKETCH OF A THEORY OF ACTION 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the "theory of 
action." Tl}-e primary sources of the analytical scheme are 
Talcott Parsons' The Structure of Social Action1 and Parsons' 
and Edward Shils' Toward~ General Theory of Action. 2 
The first purpose of this discussion is to make 
explicit the paradigm within which this research operates 
insofar as substantive questions--those about rational 
actions--are concerned. Chapter II made clear the method 
according to which this research operates, viz., the pro-
cedures of logical empiricists, where questions about 
languages and empirical assertions are concerned. This 
chapter provides a statement of the context in which ration-
al actions are viewed. Included in this statement will be 
an explication of the phrase, "rational actions." This 
chapter serves to specify precisely with which function of 
accounting this research is dealing, while the former 
1Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action 
(New York, 1949). 
2Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward a General 
Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1959). 
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chapter specified the method of analyzing the requirements 
of that function. 
The second purpose, undeniably related to the first, 
is to move toward a characterization of accounting, pre-
diction, and decision models in their function as guides 
to rational actions. Only by embracing some conception 
of action, a conception which includes rational action, 
can one characterize those models in an explicit fashion. 
As a result of specifying the rational-action-
facilitating function of accounting, prediction, and 
decision models, a clearer analysis of the structure and 
verification of accounting explanations in both the 
structured and realized plane will be possible. This, of 
course, is the primary purpose of the entire research. 
The Theory of Action 
Theory or Conceptual Categories? 
Before beginning a discussion of the theory of action, 
it will be helpful to ask whether this research is indeed 
dealing with a theory in the sense discussed in Chapter II. 
The view held is that the "theory" of action, as presented 
here, is not a theory at all. Instead, it is an (ex-
haustive)3 set of conceptual categories, i.e., a conception 
of action. The distinction is as follows. Any theory 
3on the exhaustiveness issue see Harold Bershady, 
Ideology and Social Knowledge (New York, 1973), p. 113. 
includes concepts. Concepts are names for things. A 
theory relates concepts; a theory allows deduction. 4 
All of this is not to say that Parsons' work is not 
11 theoretical 11 in the sense of being general or abstract. 
Nothing could be further from correct. Instead, all that 
is maintained is that the theory of action (This is the 
commonly used label.) is not a deductive system, but rather 
an explication of action. It unpacks the idea of action. 
And this definition of action will be sufficient for the 
purposes set out at the beginning of this chapter, i.e., 
it will allow the clarification of the conception of 
rational action and, with some elaboration, the 
functioning of accounting explanations in the context of 
rational actions. 
A Sketch of the Elements of Action 
Action is a 11 process of striving for the attainment 
of states of gratification or goals within a situation. 115 
This process is viewed as involving three elements--a 
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human actor, a situation, and the relationship of the actor 
to the objects of the situation. The relationship is a 
perspective of the actor and is labeled the 11 orientation 11 
4 George Casper Homans argues that Parsons' scheme is 
not deductive in 11 Contemporary Theory in Sociology, 11 
Handbook of Modern Sociology, ed. Robert E. L. Faris 
(Chicago, 1964), pp. 951-977. 
5Parsons and Shils, p. 234. 
of the actor toward the objects of the situation. 6 Note 
that the conception of rational action provided here 
involves the specification of those modes of orientation 
that are foremost or of overriding importance in the case 
of certain aspects of action. In other words, certain 
forms of relationships between the actor and the objects 
of the situation will be constitutively defined as the 
rational aspects of behavior. This will allow a clarifi~ 
cation of the conception of rational actions. Each of the 
elements of.action is now taken up in turn. 
The Actor 
Actors can be viewed as either individuals or as 
collectives and~ further, as either the subjects of action 
or the objects of orientation. The actor is the subject 
of a system of action if that actor's point of view is 
adopted when discussing that system. As an individual, 
the actor is a persona.li ty system; as a collective, a 
7 
social system. 
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The distinction between personality systems and social 
systems should be emphasized and clarified. Personality 
systems are "· •• the area of relations between the 
6 Talcott Parsons, "An Approach to Psychological 
Theory in Terms of the Theory of Action," Psychology: 
~Study of Science; Study!= Conceptual and Systematic; 
Vol. 3: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context, 
ed. Sigmund Koch (New Yor~l959), p:-61~ 
7Parsons and Shils, p. 56. 
organism and objects in the external environment~ par-
ticularly social and cultural objects." 8 Personality 
9 
systems involve the orientation of one actor and that 
actor's motivation and standards. Social systems, on the 
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other hand, involve a number of individual actors and their 
interaction. It is not, however, simply a plurality of 
individual actors. It is "a system which is organized 
around the problems inherent in or arising from social 
interaction . . . rather than around the problems which 
arise in connection with the integration of the actions 
of an individual actor . 
This research deals with personality systems, i.e., 
it adopts the perspective of an individual actor in an 
individual's striving for goal attainment. This will mini-
mize complications while allowing the main thrust of this 
research to remain undiminished. Notice that the object 
world of the actor can include other persons and social 
systems. However, the social aspects of the actor and 
the actor's relationships with others are not explicitly 
treated, i.e., social systems per~ are not analyzed. 
Thus, certain types of problems are avoided--those arising 
8 Guy Rocher, Talcott Parsons and American Sociology 
(New York, 1975), p. 100. 
9 Generally, the context will make clear which meaning 
of the term "actor" is intended. If this is not the case, 
the terms "subject-actor" or "object-actor," as appropriate, 
will be used. 
10Ibid. 
from social interaction--while those problems arising from 
an individual actor's attempt to integrate actions are em-
braced. Avoiding the social aspects of the situation will 
prevent a dual discussion of each element of the theory of 
actiDn. For example, when speaking of goals there would 
arise the necessity of explicating social and private 
goals, as well as examining any potential conflict between 
the two. Moreover, as previously mentioned, only rational 
aspects (to be defined later) of an individual actor's 
integrative attempts are considered. 
The Situation 
The second element of action, the situation, is that 
part of the world which the actor takes into account. 
"Specifically, it is the part (of the external world) to 
which the actor is oriented and in which the actor acts. 1111 
In other words, the situation is defined as that portion 
of the environment that stands as action-relevant with 
respect to some actor. Note that the part of the world 
which is relevant (and, thus, part of the situation) is 
determined in part by the aspect of orientation under 
question. These aspects are considered in due time. 
The situation is said to be comprised of objects. 
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These objects may be social or non-social, conditional or 
instrumental. Non-social objects may be further classified 
11Ibid.' p. 56. 
as either cultural or physica1. 12 These different 
classifications are briefly examined in this section. 
Social objects are those which are interactional, 
i.e., the subject-actor and the object-actor hold recipro-
1 t t . 13 ca expec a 1ons. Of course, one human being normally 
considers another human or collective of humans as 
social objects. Potentially, however, the concept in-
eludes more than human actors. In any case, as pointed 
out earlier, this research is not concerned specifically 
with problems of interaction or with systems organized 
around interactional problems, viz., social systems. At 
the risk of being repetitious, the reader is reminded 
that it is not assumed that there are no social objects. 
Indeed, the individual actor will have to solve inter-
actional problems. But, this solution is by a personality 
system according to the values of that system, not a 
solution by a collectivity according to the values of its 
social system. 
In contrast to social objects, non-social objects do 
not have expectations about the subject-actor's behavior. 
Before the two types of non-social objects are differenti-
ated, a discussion of culture and cultural objects is 
provided. One type of cultural objects, accounting 
statements, is very relevant to this research. However, 
12Ibid., p. 57. 
13 Rocher, pp. 33, 46. 
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any in-depth discussion must be delayed until Chapter IV. 
In Parsons' words, "Cultural objects are elements of 
cultural tradition or heritage ..• when these are taken 
as objects of orientation. 1114 Culture itself is consti-
tuted by "ways of orienting and acting." Examples of 
cultural objects are laws and ideas. As objects, cultural 
elements can be "embodied" in symbols. This embodiment 
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allows ideas, for example, to be transmitted from one actor 
15 to another. In this research, one type of cultural 
symbol system, the "cognitive," is of primary import. 
However, as mentioned earlier, closer examination 
is delayed. 
Physical objects are now distinguished from cultural 
ones. Cultural objects are transmittable via symbols from 
one actor to another. This transmission is a transfer of 
a manner of orienting. For example, one can transmit 
knowledge, an element of culture, through symbols. In 
some cases and with ef~ective communication, a new manner 
of cognitive orientation (or cognitive relationship between 
actor and some objects) will have been effected. While 
physical objects can also be transferred from one actor to 
another, only a change in possession is effected. Symbols, 
then, are a special type or aspect of physical objects. 
However, cultural objects are different than physical 
14Parsons and Shils, p. 58. 
15rbid., pp. 159~163. 
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objects--the former are both transmittable and ways of 
orienting and acting, while the latter are not. The 
latter are located in time and space, the former, except 
as "embodied" in symbols, are not. 
Cultural and physical objects can be distinguished 
in yet another way. Only cultural objects are potentially 
"internalizable" by a personality system by becoming the 
values or standards of that system. After internalization 
the actor as a personality system no longer views that 
element of culture as an object and, thus, no longer is an 
actor's orientation to that object necessary. Instead, 
that cultural element is a value standard, an aspect of 
orientation itself. 16 Orientation is discussed in the 
next section. 
One further subclassification of the situation is 
possible; this classification cuts across the previous 
social-nonsocial distinction. A situation can be analyzed 
into instrumental or conditional objects. Instrumental 
objects are those things or ideas or states of affairs 
which the actor uses or controls to bring about desired 
ends. Conditional objects are those things or ideas or 
state of affai.rs which represent constraints or conditions 
within which the actor operates. 17 For example, the lack 
of rainfall might be viewed as a condition; and, as a means 
16Ibid., pp. 8, 58, 159-163. 
17Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, p. 44. 
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of eliminating the dryness of the land, the farmer might 
resort to irrigation techniques. In short, conditional 
objects are those aspects of the situation over which the 
actor exercises no control; instrumental objects are those 
aspects over which the actor exercises control. 
Orientation 
The final element of action is the orientation of the 
actor to the situation. The actor, as a personality system, 
has a certain set of relations with the object world, i.e., 
with the elements of the situation. The actor's orien-
tation is the set of "cognitions, cathexes, plans, and rele-
vant standards which relate the actor to the situation."18 
Orientation involves the actor's "relations-to-objects. 1119 
Cathexis is defined as "· .. the attachment to objects 
that are gratifying and rejection of those which are 
. ,,20 
nOXlOUS. 
The actor's orientation to objects involves three 
elements at two different levels. The levels are 
"motivational" orientation and "value" orientation. 
Motivational orientation has cognitive, cathectic, and 
evaluative aspects or elements. Value orientation has 
18Parsons and Shils, p. 56. 
19Ibid., p. 54. 
20rbid., pp. 58-60. 
cognitive, cathectic, and moral aspects. 2L 
In order words, any action can be viewed as involving 
knowing (cognitive aspects), wanting (cathectic aspects), 
and choosing (evaluative aspects). Choice, moreover, can 
involve choice among knowledge claims, wants, and con-
sequences of choices. The knowing, wanting, and choosing 
aspects of action are the elements of motivational 
orientation. Furthermore, choice among knowledge claims, 
wants, and consequences of choice involves standards of 
value orientation. Thus, there are two levels of the 
three orientation elements. 
As pointed out, the value orientation of the actor 
involves standards. Cognitive standards rule choice among 
knowledge claims. Appreciative standards rule choice 
among immediate wants. Moral standards rule choice among 
consequences of choice. It is important to recognize that 
these standards are not "part of" the actor nor "part of" 
the object world, but rather manifested as consistent 
relations between the two. "Once values are treated as 
relational, • then making values the focus of the 
organization of systems of action becomes immediately 
feasible. 1122 
At this point it will be helpful to show once again 
how this research makes use of the above conception of 
51 
21 Ibid., p. 5. 
22 Parsons, Psychology: A Study of Science, pp. 622-23. 
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systems of action. The perspective involves personality 
systems--one actor's organization of knowledge, wants, 
and consequences in the context of a partially controllable 
object world. Moreover, the organizational aspect em-
phasized is the cognitive orientation of the actor. Up to 
this point this has been termed the "rationaln element of 
action. In short, this research examines a single actor's 
cognitive relations-to-objects, i.e., objects from a per-
spective of knowledge about those objects. Before becoming 
more precise, there is a closer examination of the modes 
of orientation and then the orientation process itself. 
Motivational Orientation. The motivational orien-
tation of a personality system is at least partially 
determined by the actor's need-dispositions, adopted value 
t d d d th t b . t . t t. 23 s an ar s, an e curren o Jec· s1 ua 1on. There has 
been a discussion of the object situation, value standards, 
and the relationship between those categories and moti-
vational orientation. This section will examine moti-
vational and value orientation more thoroughly. First, 
however, there is a brief discussion of need-dispositions. 
Need-dispositions are recognized by an actor's "· 
tendencies to orient and act with respect to objects in a 
certain manner and to expect certain consequences from 
these actions. 1124 Three points need emphasis. 
23Parsons and Shils, p. 92. 
24Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
First, 
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need-dispositions have a future as well as immediate grati-
ficatory reference. Second, need-dispositions are 
characterized by some end-in-view (need) and manipulation 
of objects to reach those ends (disposition). Third, 
orientations are the consequences of the need-dispositions. 
In other words, orientations (relations-to-objects) are, 
in principle, empirically observable, while wants per se 
are postulated as partial determinants of those observed 
1 t . h. 25 re a lOnS lpS. 
Motivational orientation, then, is classified into 
three aspects or modes which are need-dispositional-neces-
sary. · If there are need-dispositions, then there must be 
knowledge of the object world (the cognitive mode or the 
manifestation of cognitive processes), a desire for a new 
or maintained relationship with those objects (the cathectic 
mode or cathectic process manifestations), and choice among 
potential means and goals (evaluative mode). 
The cognitive mode of orientation is· the result of 
processes which allow the actor to discriminate among 
objects and to relate those objects to one another and to 
his needs. The cathectic mode is a result of processes 
which leaves objects (or, more precisely, certain relation-
ships between actor and objects) either desirable or 
undesirable from the actor's point of view. 
Clearly, those two processes are inextricably bound 
~ 5 Ib1·d., 92 115 pp . ' ' . 
together. If the actor cannot discriminate among objects 
and if factual relations of objects to objects and objects 
to needs are unknown, then the actor cannot attach a 
positive or negative cathexis to those objects. On the 
other hand, if objects are not cathected, there is little 
interest in what objects (or groups of objects in some 
particular relation with one another, i.e. situations) 
will follow as consequences as the result of some action. 
Obviously, then, both cognitive and cathetic processes 
must operate in light of one another if any actor-relevant 
discriminations among objects are to be effected. 26 
Given an actor's achievement of cathectic-cognitive 
orientation, there still remains the problem of evaluating 
various alternatives. , In general, there will be competing 
wants at a point in time and over time. The evaluative 
mode of orientation is the process of choosing among 
alternatives. Formally, the evaluative mode involves 
II the processes by which the actor allocates his 
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energy among the various actions with respect to various 
cathected ~bjects in an attempt to maximize gratification. rF 7 
The actor organizes the cathectic-cognitive discriminations. 
This organization is a cognitive act, with cognition serving 
th · f · t 2 8 Th . th t . more an one specl-lC wan • e prlor ca ec lC-
26rbid., pp. 68-69. 
27Ibid., p. 59. 
28 Ibid. , p. 71. 
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cognitive process has determined the effects of various 
actions on various objects' relations to the actor's needs; 
the evaluative process is the more complex procedure of 
developing an intelligent plan of action which will result 
in some overall maximization of gratification over time. 29 
In surri, the paradigm of motivational orientation can 
be viewed as the process of an actor's mapping of available 
knowledge of factual relationships among objects onto the 
actor's cathected, personal relations-to-objects. Since 
the actor is an object, the cathectic-cognitive orientation 
can be more simply described as the discrimination of 
actor-relevant; object-to-object relationships. Then, the 
evaluative mode of orientation becomes operative as choice 
among competing wants becomes necessary. The evaluative 
mode is a process of organizing the cathectic-cognitive 
discriminations. Evaluation is the act of choice among 
various means and the resulting outcomes (which are spelled 
out through the earlier cathectic-cognitive process). As 
a final note, it should be recognized that means and goals 
are "packaged." In general, different means (instrumental 
actions) result in different outcomes. Nevertheless, there 
is a separable cognitive aspect to any choice process. 
Value Orientation. The discussion of the act of 
choosing can be made more complete by considering the 
standards involved in those choices. The act of choice 
29Ibid. 
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is an aspect of motivational orientation. The standards 
involved in such acts are aspects of value orientation. 
In the discussion of motivational orientation, the 
sequence of processes that comprise orientation was 
emphasized. Evaluation was limited to choice among con-
sequences of alternative courses of actiono Now, with 
consideration of the standards involved in the evaluative 
mode, the sequential features of motivational orientation 
are blurred. Choice or evaluation can involve choice 
among competing knowledge claims and competing wants, as 
well as consequences. There is more to choice than the 
organization of cathectic-cognitive discriminations. The 
three value standards, cognitive, appreciative, and moral, 
are now discussed in turn. 
Decisions about the validity of competing factual 
claims will involve cognitive standards. When one has to 
choose among competing assertions, there will be some 
standard-based method for determining the·validity of 
. 30 those assertlons. Two points must be made. First, one 
might disagree with the statement that cognitive standards 
are essential. The argument might be that from among 
competing assertions an actor will choose that which 
"best" attains the objective of the actor. Thus, there 
are no "cognitive" standards, rather only personally best 
claims. However, this argument is confused. Before 
30Ibid., p. 59. 
choosing among competing knowledge c1 aims, the actor must 
know which are factually correct. For example, suppose 
there are three statements available to an actor: ( 1) ·"If 
A, thenX", (2) ·"If B, then Y", (3) "If C, then Z," where 
"A, 11 "B," and "C" represent distinct courses of action, 
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and "X," "Y," and "Z" represent distinct outcomes. Before 
choosing a course of action, the actor must know which of 
the above statements are factually correct. In other words, 
only after the factual correctness of claims is determined, 
can the actor choose among alternative courses of instru-
mental action such that objectives are achieved. In short, 
the actor demands knowledge. Choice among competing 
factual assertions is the determination of valid knowledge 
claims. Thus, this choice precedes the choice of instru-
mental actions. 
Second, it should be recognized that Chapter·II of 
this study spelled out the method that will be used to 
examine the assertions.of accounting. Thus, given the 
paradigm of action and with limitation to cognitive 
(rational) aspects, implications for empirical accounting 
assertions can be derived. In a sense, cognitive standards 
are going to be derived. 
The second of the value standards, appreciative 
standards, allows the actor to assess an object's immediate 
gratificatory significance. Note that there is no assess-
ment of the consequences of acts, but only of the immediate 
t . f. t. . t 31 gra 1 1ca 1on g1ven ou comes. Actions and results 
are viewed in isolation from other actions and results. 
Moral standards allow the actor to assess the con-
sequences of action. These complement the appreciative 
mode which, as pointed out earlier, is conjoined with the 
cognitive mode. The moral standards are concerned with 
consequences of action on the action system as a whole. 
They are the most integrative of all standards. 32 
Pattern Variables 
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Up to this point, a sketch of the theory of action has 
been provided. The sketch included a discussion of the 
actor, the situation, and orientation of the actor to the 
situation. The orientation involves both motivation and 
standards or values. This section introduces "pattern 
variables." The pattern variables represent crucial 
orientation decisions which are made prior to action. The 
choice in each dilemma faced by the actor allows the actor 
to come to grips with the situation. 33 
A pattern variable is defined as "· a dichotomy, 
one side of which must be chosen by an actor before the 
meaning o:f a situation is determinate :for him, and thus 
31Ibid., p. 60. 
32Ibid. 
33 Harold Bershady, p. 109~ 
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before he can act with respect to that situation. 1134 There 
are four basic dilemmas of orientation; thus, there are 16 
possible combinations. A rational action is defined as one 
specific set of those 16 combinations. The specific 
pattern of four choices which is definGd as rational action 
could be called a "rational pattern" of action. As the 
reader may suspect, rational patterns are those which em-
phasize cognitive orientation. 
Figure 4 provides a schematic of the dilemmas of 
orientation classified by (l) modes of orientation and 
(2) objects of the situation. The reader should refer to 
this diagram as the discussion of the pattern variables 
35 progresses. 
The first step in the orientation process does not 
present any dilemmas; it is essential that the actor know 
the factual relationships among objects and·that the actor 
has discriminated objects along a cathectic dimension. 
This is the primary aspect of orientation. Notice that 
implicit in this cathectic-cognitive discrimination is the 
assumption that (1) if competing knowledge claims have 
presented themselves, there has been adjudication through a 
process based on standards of cognitive validity, and 
(2) if competing wants have presented themselves for 
34Parsons and Shils, p. 77. 
35Th" d" . l" P d Sh"l 48 lS lscusslon re les on arsons an l s, pp. , 
77-88; and Harold Bershady, pp. 36-40. 
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immediate gratification, appreciative standards have ruled 
some wants must be suppressed. 
Modes of Orientation 
Cathectic-Cognitive Discriminations 
(1) 
I . 
Evaluate 
/~ 
Universalism Particularism (2) 
~ 
Do not evaluate 
Objects of the Situation 
Physical or Social 
I ~ 
(3) Performance Quality 
(4) Specificity Diffuseness 
Figure 4. A Schematic of the Dilemmas of Orientation 
The first orientation dilemma now presents itself. 
The actor must decide whether to evaluate. This is the 
dilemma of affectivity versus affective neutrality. The 
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actor must either exercise discipline or simply act such 
that immediate impuLses are satisfied. A rational system 
of action is defined as one which exercises discipline or 
is affectively neutral. 
Inherent in the first dilemma of orientation for a 
personality system is the nature of the discipline. Given 
that there is to be evaluation of the consequences of 
action, i.e., a posture of affective neutrality, then there 
must have been a decision regarding which interests are to 
be held out·as primary with respect to consequences. A 
self-orientation emphasizes private interests, while a 
collective-orientation emphasizes the interests of the 
group in question. The rational actor may adopt either 
36 posture. 
The second dilemma is that of universalism versus 
particularism; the actor may· judge an object either on the 
basis of cognitive or appreciative standards. When ap-
preciative standards are primary, there is a tendency to 
judge an object with respect to that object's specific, 
contextual relationship with the actor, while cognitive 
standards judge objects according to categories which are 
independent of a particular actor's needs. In Parson's 
words: 
36At one time Parsons included the self- versus 
collective-orientation as a pattern variable but later 
dropped this as a basic dilemma. See Guy Rocher, p. 37. 
The (second dilemma) is that between evaluating 
the object of an action in terms of its relations 
to a generalized frame of reference, on the one 
hand, and evaluating it in terms of its relations 
to the actor and his own specific relations to 
objects on the other.37 
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It is posited that a rational actor holds appreciative 
standards as primary with respect to goal objects and 
cognitive standards as primary with respect to instrumental 
objects. Indeed, the choice of appreciative or cognitive 
standards for judging objects (or groups of object, i.e., 
situations) is equivalent to the specification of objects 
as goals or instruments. 
It might be argued that the choice of means involves 
appreciative standards. There are two counters. First, 
there are, nonetheless, cognitive aspects involved in 
the choice of means; this research is concerned with these. 
Or, second, a rational actor is postulated as a limiting 
concept, i.e., at the point where there are no cathectic 
aspects of instruments. These object instruments are 
desired only because of what they can, with proper 
manipulation, bring about; and, the factual validity of 
these consequences is a cognitive question. 
A third dilemma facing the actor is how to view an 
object or situation. If the actor views an object as a 
performance complex, then there is concern for that ob-
ject's consequences as a result of its actions. On the 
37Parsons and Shils, p. 48. 
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other hand, if the actor views objects as quality complexes 
then there is concern for the object "as it is," independent 
of the relation-between qualities and performances. 
Whether the rational actor views objects as performance 
or quality complexes depends, once again, or whether the 
objects are viewed as instrumental or goal objects. As an 
instrument, the performance attributes of the object are 
relevant. This view of objects, according to the preceding 
argument, emphasizes cognitive standards. Concerning goal 
objects, the actor might view those objects as either 
quality or performance complexes. If the object is an "end 
in itself" then appreciative standards rule; however, if 
the object is desired only for its potential to bring forth 
other objects, then cognitive standards rule. It is a 
cognitive question whether that object will in fact bring 
forward those other objects. Of course, in this latter 
case the goal object would be more properly classified as 
an instrument. 
The last pattern variable, diffuseness or specificity, 
is the least clear as to which aspect of orientation is 
involved. If the actor grants the object-actor all re-
qu~sts not interfering with higher obligations, then that 
actor has a diffuse relationship with the object-actor. On 
the other hand, a specific relation is clearly defined and 
limited. 
Notice, then, that in the case of diffuse relation-
ships, the "higher obligations" would in the case of 
• 
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"intellectual" activity be cognitive standard-based. But 
in the case of "aesthetic" activity, the higher obligations 
would be appreciative standard-based. On the other hand, a 
specific relation could be defined on either set of 
standards. In any event, it does not appear that the 
specification of the relationship between the actor and 
object-actor sheds any light on the research problem, since 
it has already been specified that this research is not 
concerned with social systems. Thus, the type of inter-
action, the main characteristic of social systems, is 
irrelevant to this research. 
Rational Action 
At this point rational action in terms of the theory 
of action can be defined. A rational system of action is 
one which exhibits patterns of affective-neutrality 
(evaluation) wjth universalistic (cognitive) evaluation 
standards on performance-perceived instrumental objects and 
with particularistic (appreciative) standards on quality-
perceived goal objects. Figure 5 provides a schematic of 
t . 1 t. 38 ra 1ona ac 1on. 
this chapter. 
The discussion which follows summarizes 
Notice in Figure 5 that the actor is the subject, a 
personality system (in this case a rational personality 
system as previously defined), and an object. The actor as 
38This parallels Parsons' "instrumental action." See 
Parsons and Shils, p. 75. 
65 
object is both condition and mean (instrument). The person-
ality system defines relevant modes of orientation along 
each step of the process of action. As subject, the actor's 
point of view is adopted; the goals are the actor's, for 
instance. 
Rational A Rational Action Path 
Ac~to~ (Plan of i.nstrumental action--Results 
of complete orientation) 
i 
End or 
Goal 
;}. 
Subject Instrumental and Conditional Goal Objects 
~ Objects A 
,,, A I 
I I 
' 
" 
" 
' 
' 
' ' 
' 
I I 
I 
Cognitive 1standards 
A\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Appreciative 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/-:? 
\ Ratlonal I Personality / System 
Figure 5. Rational Action 
Standards 
The first task of the actor is to achieve cathectic-
cognitive discrimination. This is the process of mapping 
factual relations among instrumental objects given con-
ditional objects onto desired situations (certain relation-
ships among objects, including the actor). 
However, in general, not all goals will be available, 
i.e., some will be mutually exclusive. Moreover, certain 
means may exclude certain other means, thus eliminating 
the possibility of attaining the different goals implied 
by those means. As a result, the actor must evaluate 
alternative courses of action. This choice mnong goals, 
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then, relies on moral standards, while the spelling out of 
alternatives requires cognitive and appreciative standards. 
Moreover, the instrumental portion of action relies solely 
on cognitive standards when it is necessary to choose 
among alternative statements about the factual relations 
among instrumental and goal objects. 
This, then, is the conception of rational action 
maintained throughout this study. The remainder of this 
research js concerned with statements about the relations 
among instrumental and goal objects. To ease discussion, 
it will be assumed that the goals, whatever their specific 
content, are given. This approach will bring cognitive 
aspects of decision making to full light. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE STRUCTURED PLANE 
Introduction 
The task of this research is to examine the account-
ing implications of the rational aspects of the decision 
process. The discussion relies on three fundamental 
conceptions. First, it is maintained that a rational 
actor's language can be analyzed into syntactic, semantic, 
and pragmatic aspects. Secondly, actions are viewed as 
involving three analytically distinct dimensions--the 
cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative. Thirdly, two 
accounting functions, planning and control, are recognized. 
This chapter deals with the planning function of 
accounting insofar as cognitive aspects of action are 
concerned. Viewing accounting as a language allows the 
analysis of accounting statements into their syntactic 
and semantic aspects. The next chapter will adopt the 
same method of analysis on the control aspects of 
accounting explanation. 
Since the above-mentioned fundamental conceptions 
permeate the remainder of this research, a brief review 
and coordination of these notions will follow. This will 
allow a characterization and analysis of the decision 
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process and generation of certain accounting implications 
from that analysis. 
Structured and Realized Planes 
Accounting is typically analyzed into planning and 
control functions. It is maintained in this research that 
planning operates on the "structured plane," while control 
operates on the "realized plane." A schematic of' the 
conceptual difference between planning and control is given 
in Figure 6. 
Realized 
Plane 
Structured 
Instrumental Actions 
~~------------------------------~. 
Plane Plans/Representations 
State1 
Figure 6. Conceptual Difference Between 
Planning and Control 
The structured plane involves representations or plans 
of instrumental action, while the realized plane involves 
the implementation and results of planned actions. Plans 
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effect instrumental actions through efferent channels, 
while afferent channels feed back information about state 
outcomes. In t:he words of Herbert Simon, "Afferent 
channels give (an actor) information about the state of the 
environment; efferent channels cause action on the environ-
ment."1 It is clear that for the efferent channels to be 
effective, afferent channels are necessary. Nevertheless, 
as in the discussion of any process, one must enter the 
cycle somewhere. Thus, this chapter discusses the 
structured plane in isolation from the problems presented 
by the accounting function of control. 
Rational Actions 
The issues addressed in this chapter are concerned 
with efferent channels, those which effect action. Clearly, 
there are a great number of ways to bring about some 
instrumental action. For instance, one can order another, 
plead with another, or deceive another. But, regardless of 
the method one uses, there is the requirement that the 
action will in fact bring about the desired state of 
affairs. (Whether in fact the instrumental action did 
bring about the desired state of affairs involves the 
control aspects of accounting. Discussion of this topic 
1Herbert A. Simon, "The Logic of Heuristic Decision 
Making," The Logic of Decision and Action, ed. Nicholas 
Rescher, (Pittsburgh, 1966), p. 9. 
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is provided in Chapter V.) In this chapter the analysis is 
not concerned with the nature of the operational method by 
which instrumental actions are effected, but rather with the 
cognitive requirements of the efferent channels. 
For example, suppose an actor desires to bring about 
some end result, X, and that the mutually exclusive means, 
A, B, or C, are available. Moreover, means A involves an 
instrumental object-actor. The cognitive aspects of this 
situation include whether in fact means A, B, and C will 
bring about·x and, if there are alternative ways (pleading, 
ordering) of bringing about the object-actor's actions, 
whether these ways will in fact be effective. In short, 
then, this chapter deals with the cognitive aspects of 
the action-effecting dimension of accounting in the context 
of a specified paradigm of action. Moreover, the discussion 
is temporarily freed from the problems of the afferent 
channels and, thus, the control process of accounting. 
The Paradigm of Action 
The paradigm of action embraced here involves an 
actor, a situation, and an actor's orientation to the 
situation. The actor is the subject of action, an object 
of the situation, and a personality system. The aspect of 
accounting which is presently of concern is brought out 
most clearly by defining a rational system or, more 
precisely, a rational actor as a personality system. 
The rational actor as a personality system is defined, 
in part, as one who views instrumental objects in the con-
text of performance attributes. The relevant properties 
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of instrumental objects are those that are indicative of 
what an object (social, physical, or cultural) can effect. 
Goal objects, on the other hand, are evaluated according to 
their qualities independent of their performance attributes. 
The rational actor's orientation to objects will vary 
as the object is an instrumental or a goal object. The 
rational actor maintains an affectively-neutral attitude 
toward performance-perceived instrumental objects. As a 
result, cognitive standards rule in the evaluation of these 
objects; and, the evaluation concerns whether the objects, 
under certain manipulations, will bring about certain de-
sired situations (groups of objects in a specified relation-
ship with one another and the actor). On the other hand, 
goal objects are quality-perceived with appreciative 
standards guiding evaluation of these objects. 
Accounting Reports 
It is convenient at this point to discuss accounting 
reports. In terms of the theory of action and in the 
context of rational actions, accounting symbols are the 
"embodiment" of cognitive, cultural objects. Moreover, 
the actor views the symbols of accounting as intrumental, 
not goal, objects. Thus, the relevant properties of the 
cognitive symbols are those that indicate what those 
symbols, or objects represented by those symbols, can 
effect; and, the symbols are evaluated according to 
cognitive standards. 
Notice that the accounting symbols can be evaluated 
along one or both of two dimensions. First, they may be 
evaluated as to whether they will produce from an object-
actor a specified response. Most accountants would label 
this the behavioral aspect of accounting reports. Second, 
the accounting signals can be evaluated as to whether they 
are valid in the sense that (l) they are "true to the 
facts" or (2) they are indeed consistent with deductive 
systems which allow the actor to predict outcomes from 
instrumental actions and to choose among alternative 
courses of action. 
The concept of validity as "true to facts" is vague 
and receives elaboration near the end of this chapter 
when the semantical aspects of accounting statements are 
discussed. As an example of this vagueness, note that 
72 
some accountants appear to use "true to the facts" in some 
near metaphysical sense, advocating true income approaches 
to accounting. Reaction to their proposals appears to take 
the form of rejecting the concept of truth. One accomplish-
ment of this chapter is to place the controversy in a new 
perspective. For now, let it suffice to note that the 
second concept of validity can encompass the first, allow-
ing elimination of vagueness. 
In any event, the question remains, "With which of the 
two primary dimensions is this research concerned?" The 
answer is a qualified "both." An explanation follows. If 
one views the behavioral aspects of accounting signals as 
the response to those signals by an object-actor in an 
affective manner, and, thus, with respect to appreciative 
standards, then our research is not concerned with this 
dimension of accounting signals, per ~· In such a case 
accounting objects are, relative to a rational personality 
(as defined here), goal objects. On the other hand, j.f 
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the l:ehavioral aspects of accounting signals involve the 
response by an object-actor in an affectively-neutral manner 
and, thus, with respect to cognitive standards, then our 
research is concerned with the behavioral dimension. But in 
this latter case and with treatment of the actor as 
subject, the response will be based on what the accounting 
signals can produce as a result of the response of some 
object-actor(s). (The object-actor's response may be 
affective or affectively-neutral; it does not matter to 
this research.) The response of the object-actor is a 
factual question, while the action of the subject-actor--
whether to emit a certain accounting signal--depends on the 
answer to that factual question and the goals of the 
subject-actor. Thus, the behavioral aspects of accounting 
signals, as treated in this research, involve the question, 
"Are the signals consistent with deductive systems whj_ch 
allow the actor to predict outcomes from instrumental 
actions?" Notice, however, that this is a description of 
the second dimension of accounting signals. This is why 
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it was stated, with qualification, that both behavioral 
and non-behavioral features of accounting symbols are con-
sidered; viz., the two features can be characterized as 
involving the "consistency" dimension of accounting signals 
relative to a rational personality system which views those 
signals as instrumental objects. 
Analysis of Language 
The analysis of accounting as a language follows the 
method of semiotics. Language is comprised of syntactic, 
semantic, and pragmatic features. Pragmatics is avoided 
in this research insofar as the analysis of language is 
concerned but not insofar as the relationship of account-
ing to actors is concerned. This research embraces prag-
matic aspects at those points where the cognitive functions 
of accounting is delineated, since that delineation involves 
a description of the relationship of accounting statements 
to the users of those statements and also implies certain 
necessary logical characteristics of accounting statements. 
Presumably, accountants attempt to provide accounting 
statements that adequately serve those cognitive functions 
by issuing statements that meet the implied logical charac~ 
teristics. Thus, description of the functions of accounting 
statements and the logical requirements necessitated by 
those functions leads to a specification of the requisite 
relationship of accountants to accounting statements. In 
this sense, Chapter III can be viewed as primarily pragmatic 
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analysis, viz., a determination of the function of account-
ing statements. Moreover, this chapter is interpretable 
as pragmatic analysis at those points where logical charac-
teristics of accounting statements are specified, since it 
is implied that accountants will ~ttempt to issue statements 
that meet these requirements. A relationship between 
accountants and accounting statements is implied. 
Syntax examines language as marks on paper. It in-
volves the study of operations on these marks to form 
expressions-(including sentences) and operations on 
sentences to derive new sentences. While syntax examines 
the form of statements without regard to content, semantics 
involves the study of the meaning of syntactically sound 
statements. This involves the coordination of descriptive 
expressions and empirical objects or operations. 
In a deductive system th~re will be some extralogical, 
descriptive terms which receive direct coordination with 
observables by means of rules of designation (as discussed 
in Chapter II), while others will not. For example, the 
expression, "cost," is in certain cases identified as the 
empirical object, "increase in dollar expenditure as a re-
sult of a specified act." In other cases the expression 
is treated as "theoretical." For example, in elementary 
economic analysis, an actor's avoidance of a particular 
act would be explained by stating that the utility fore-
gone ("cost") would have exceeded the utility gained. 
Clearly, "cost" is not directly coordinated to any empirical 
76 
referent; it is a primitive or theoretical concept. 
Analogous to the treatment of a certain expression 
as empirical in one deductive system and theoretical in 
another is the treatment of all expressions of a certain 
deductive system as theoretical in one case and then treat-
ing some of the same expressions as empirical even though 
they retain the same position in the same deductive system. 
For example, Euclidean geometry has been fully formalized--
the logical structure of this system can be examined, 
independent of any empirical interpretation. However, if 
one wishes to apply this deductive system, then some 
expressions ( e • g. , 11 line, 11 straight, 11 "point") , must be 
coordinated to empirical objects or operations. In short, 
semantical questions become relevant. 
The approach used in this chapter mirrors the above 
approach. First, the syntactical aspects of the deductive 
systems served by accounting statements are explored. Then, 
semantical questions are addressed. Of course, all of this 
is done within the context of the theory of rational action. 
This completes the summary and initial coordination 
of the first three chapters. Next, an analysis of the de-
cision process is provided by adopting the paradigm of the 
1971 Committee Report on Accounting Theory Construction 
and Verification and placing that paradigm in the larger 
context of the theory of action. The analysis is restricted 
to a rational personality system and efferent information 
channels. Then, this chapter examines the syntactical and 
semantical features of accounting statements as instru-
mental objects of the efferent channels from the point of 
view of a rational actor's decision process. 
Decision Processes and the Structured Plane 
The 1971 Committee's View 
Figure 7 reproduces the schematic representation 
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provided by the Committee with only slight modification. 
All inputs to the accounting system are held to be empiri-
cal or "real world phenomena," while the output may be 
either analytic or empirical. For example, the inputs 
might be the dollar outlay for some kind of machinery, 
the useful life of that equipment, and the salvage value 
of the equipment. The output might be the calculated 
depreciation, which, as interpreted by accountants, is 
not an observable. 
The outputs of the accounting system serve as inputs 
to prediction models, while the outputs of the prediction 
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models enter a decision model. For example, the accounting 
system might provide as an input the dollar mnount of cash 
of some entity at two points in time. This information, 
along with certain other inputs, may, in turn, allow the 
prediction of future interest rates charged to the firm. 
2 
"Report of the Committee on Accounting Theory Con-
struction and Verification," Accounting Review, Supplement 
to Vol. XLVI (1971), pp. 50-79. 
Finally~ the predicted future interest rates might be 
treated as inputs to a capital budgeting model, which, 
in certain cases, constitutes a decision model and thus 
provides choice among alternative capital expenditures. 
Theory 
Plane 
Observation 
Plane 
Key: 
I 
r? Accounting ~ Prediction ~ Decision 
System I Model I Model 
I I 
I I 
I I 
\ll w_ 
\\ '\ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ 
Direct flows of symbolic represen-
tation" 
- - - - Verification links (to the extent 
they exist) . 
Figure 7. Accounting as a Measurement-
Communication Function 
Decision Process in Context of 
the Theory of Action 
This research explicitly adopts the point of view of 
an actor as a personality system. The actor attempts to 
maximize gratification in a situation comprised of con-
ditional and instrumental objects. The actor desires to 
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attain certain relationships among objects. The actor must 
identify goal objects and constraints or conditions and must 
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map instrumental objects onto goal objects under given 
conditions. 
The actor's initial problem is displayed schematically 
in Figure 8. For each goal relationship, Gi' and each set 
of conditions, C . , the actor must determine the means M .. , J lJ . 
of obtaining that relationship. For example, Figure 8 
shows that under condtions c 3 , the actor can obtain goal 
relationship G2 through the implementation of instrumental 
action M23 . Once the actor has achieved this cathectic-
cognitive ·discrimination, the actor can evaluate, using 
some appreciative standards, various alternative actions. 
Finally, some plan of action is chosen. 
Alternative Conditions 
cl c2 c3 0 0 0 c n 
Gl Mll Ml2 Ml3 Mln 
Potential G2 M2l M22 M23 M2n Goals 
. 0 
0 0 0 
. 0 0 
. . . 
Gm M ml M m2 M m3 M mn 
Figure 8. Mapping of Means on Goals 
Under Given Conditions 
Coordination of Committee's Paradigm 
and the Theory of Action 
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This section coordinates the committee's view and the 
paradigm of rattonal action. Prediction models are methods 
for determining the results of various instrumental actions 
under given conditions. Prediction models are themselves 
means of mapping instrumental means onto outcomes. 
Of course, not all prediction models will be used; only 
those tailored to the actor's goals will be considered. In 
other words, only certain cognitive discriminations are 
relevant to the actor in any situatton. This leads to a 
complication, viz., the problem of choice among prediction 
models. Under the current paradigm, the actor cannot 
evaluate alternatives until a cognittve discrimination among 
instrumental objects has been attained. Prediction models 
are instrumental objects and are also means of cognitive dis-
crimination. Thus, there must be some cognitively dis-
criminating device allowing choice of prediction models. 
Clearly, one is trapped in an infinite regress. One possi-
ble solution is to posit that cognitive standards are the 
first cognitively discriminating devices and that these 
standards rank prediction models according to these 
standards. Then, the actor would choose among these models 
according to his appreciative standards. In any event, the 
situation is problematic. Indeed, the next chapter shall 
attempt to come to grips with this question. 
The second complication involves the interpretation 
of Figure 8. In general, as initial conditions change, 
different means must be chosen to effect any particular 
3 
outcome. Moreover, a change in initial conditions may 
come about in one of two ways--the actor may bring 
about new conditions through appropriate instrumental 
actions, or new conditions might follow from present con-
ditions regardless of actor's actions. Thus, as repre-
sented in Figure 8, one must view the condtions as more 
or less complex--more complex when a condition implies 
some future condition, less complex when an actor controls 
future relevant outcomes. In the more complex case, one 
condition stands for a chain of successive atomic con-
ditions~ In the less complex case, an outcome given 
conditions must be mapped back as a new condition. 
With prediction models allowing an actor to achieve 
cognitive discrimination, decision models must be the 
method of evaluation of or choice among various goals. 
This implies that a decision model functions to weight 
appreciative standards in a fashion determined by moral 
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3one exception to this is the case where the outcomes· 
are not subject to the control of the actor. For example, 
assume that when conditions c4 and c5 are present, the 
actor must accept outcomes o 4 and 0 5 , respectively. In that 
case, a change from c4 to c 5 would not demand the choice of 
different means quite simply because there are no effective 
means available. under those conditions.. This might be 
termed "destiny." In any event, prediction of future out-
comes is essential if instrumental action is to be 
effective. 
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standards, which, as discussed in Chapter·III, serve to 
assess consequences on the action system as a whole. In 
other words, initially the actor cathects certain objects 
due to individual appreciative standards. Then the means, 
if any, of achieving those outcomes are determined through 
the operation of prediction models. Finally, choices 
among alternative courses of action are made according to 
decision models which weight the appreciative-standard-
based, individually desirable outcomes in a manner which 
reflect moral standards. The distinction between pre-
diction and decision models is important and inescapable 
if one accepts the concept of rational action and the 
committee's paradigm. 
A summary of the coordination of the two paradigms 
follows. Under the theory of rational action, it is 
necessary that the actor as a personality system define 
all goals, i.e., desired relationships among objects, 
where the actor is one such object. Then, the actor must 
achieve a cognitive discrimination among objects. This 
involves prediction of outcomes from various instrumental 
actions given conditions, i.e., the actor must know current 
conditions and results from actions under various con-
ditions. As pointed out there may be a chain of conditions 
and coordinated instrumental actions. 4 So far, then, the 
4 such chains, i.e., action over time, allows cor-
rection of deviations from "rational action paths." This 
is one control aspect of the cognitive accounting function 
and is discussed in Chapter V. 
actor has achieved cathectic-cognitive discrimination. 
Finally, the actor evaluates the available, alternative 
action-complexe~. Thus, there are cathectic, cognitive, 
and evaluative dimensions of the process of action. 
The committee's view coordinates as follows. (The 
reader should return to Figure 7.) First, selections are 
made from the observation plane. These observables are 
represented and processed such that they are consistent 
with prediction models. The inputs to prediction models 
are the current existing conditions and various available 
instrumental acts. The models will predict (1) future 
conditions given present conditions regardless of actor's 
actions, (2) future conditions given instrumental actions 
and current conditions, and (3) goal outcomes from various 
instrumental acts given current conditions. Of course, 
outputs from prediction models of type (1) and (2) will 
be inputs to model type (3). The outputs from model type 
(3) are inputs to decision models-~a method of evalu-
ation of alternative, mean-goal package complexes. 
Before beginning the syntactical and semantical 
analysis, two observations are made. Both revolve around 
the committee's failure to distinguish between prediction 
and decision models. First, return to Figure 7. Notice 
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the arrow that starts from outputs of the accounting system, 
bypasses prediction models, and enters decision models 
directly. The question arises, 11 What sort of decision model 
would demand an input which is not a prediction of some 
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future outcome?'' The answer is that it must be a model 
which attaches to the object(s) represented by the account-
ing output or which attaches to the accounting output 
itself in an affective, as opposed to affectively~neutral 
manner. This is true since decision models are evaluative 
mechanisms based on weighted appreciative standards. But 
the rational actor is concerned with future outcomes and 
the evaluation among these goal relationships. In other 
words, only future outcomes are relevant as inputs to 
decision models as characterized here. 
It might be argued that some accounting outputs are 
predictions. In this case it would be wise to disentangle 
two concepts, representations of objects (including 
measurement, of course) and predictions from these obser-
vations. It may be that accounting systems encompass 
prediction models. In this case the schematic in Figure 7 
is poorly conceived. As viewed here, however, accounting 
systems make observations consistent with various prediction 
models. There cannot be a bypassing of prediction models, 
whether implicit or explicit, when rational actions as 
defined here are under consideration. 
The second observation mirrors the first. This 
research accepts the committee's distinction between pre-
diction and decision models. Moreover, within the context 
of the theory of action, decision models are the method of 
evaluation of potential goal relationships. Consider the 
example of a decision model given in the committee report: 
If' someone wants to know whether one body will 
float on another, then they can apply this model. 
The model precisely specifies what properties 
are to be ~easured and how they are to be manipu-
lated. Weight and volume are to be measured 
and a host of other properties are not to be 
measured (Emphasis added).5 
The model referred to is one which compares the specific 
gravity of a solid body and a liquid; the body will float 
on the liquid if the body has the lower specific gravity. 
Notice, however, that the committee's example is not a 
decision model but rather a prediction model. First, 
there is emphasis on cognition and the future, i.e., 
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someone wishes to know if a body will float. Second, there 
is emphasis on instrumentality, i.e., there is specifi-
cation of what properties to manipulate. This process of 
achieving knowledge about what to do to achieve some 
outcome has been-termed cathectic-cognitive discrimi-
nation. What remains of the decision process is, for 
example, evaluation of various floatation alternatives. 
That is, does the actor desire to float, for example, a 
red or a green piece of wood? This choice is evaluated 
through appreciative standards. Under the broadest 
formulation, the evaluation process involves the actor's 
choosing according to the color he likes best. 
In short, the committee failed to adhere to a dis-
tinction between prediction and decision models. One may 
argue that they distinguish~ but in a fashion differently 
5
"Committee Report," p. 61. 
from this research. That is very close to the point; the 
point is that the committee has failed to distinguish 
clearly. This may be the result of not operating within a 
larger context. This research supplies that context. 
Accounting Explanation in the Structured 
Plane--A Syntactical and 
Semantical Analysis 
This section turns to the primary task of this 
chapter, viz., analyzing from the viewpoint of logical 
empiricists the characteristics of accounting explanations 
in the structured plane. With the committee's paradigm 
placed within the context of the theory of action, an 
examination of the linguistic aspects of the efferent 
channels of accounting systems as they function to facili-
tate rational action is possible. 
Accounting Explanation 
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First, allow an explication of the phrase "accounting 
explanation." Begin with "explanation." Returning to 
Figure 7, one finds that accounting systems or models are 
guided by prediction models selected by some actor as 
relevant. Remember that due to inconsistency with the 
analytic distinction between prediction and decision models 
within the context of rational actions, the direct flow of 
information from accounting models to decision models has 
been eliminated. Explanation, then, is defined as the 
process of prediction of future outcomes. This encom-
passes selection of events or objects from the observation 
plane, symbolic· representation of selected events and 
objects, processing and inputing the representations into 
prediction models, generating predictions, and represent-
ing prediction model outputs in decision model-relevant 
form. 
Next, consider the modifier "accounting" in the 
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phrase "accounting explanation." It is a truism that ac-
counting explanations are those concerned with "accounting" 
information. However, it is not at all clear how accounting 
information differs from, say, economic, behavioral, or 
sociological data. For example, disclosures relative to 
"loss contingencies" are, in some cases, predictions--
presumably accounting predictions and, thus, accounting 
explanation. However, the input to such predictions could 
conceivably be data that would not generally be specified 
as "accounting" data. For example, in the case of a loss 
contingency from an unasserted claim by a third party, 
such information as outcomes in similar cases, length of 
time since third party injury, and governmental inquiry 
fi~dings are possible inputs to the prediction of the 
likelihood of an unfavorable settlement. On the other 
hand, what is perceived as accounting data may be the input 
to a model for prediction of (classification of) each firm 
of a group of firms as economic failures or non-failures. 
In this case the output is not recognized as accounting 
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information, ~ se. In short, one can identify cases 
where accounting information is generated from non-
accounting data and non-accounting information is generated 
by accounting data. What, then, are the characteristics 
unique to accounting information? In light of the above 
discussion, the best approach appears to be to leave the 
question unanswered, particularly since an answer would 
seem to provide no advantage to this research. 
An Analysis_of Logical Structure 
Generalized Model. In the structured plane, an 
accounting explanation will be in response to the question, 
"What will result if action M is taken?" or "How can I 
achieve goal relationship G?" It is assumed that goals 
have been specified. Some of these goals may not be 
attainable; that determination is, of course, part of the 
task of explanation. Also, it is assumed that prediction 
models have been chosen. This latter assumption is relaxed 
in Chapter V when control aspects of accounting expla-
nations are discussed, since planning and control can be 
distinguished in a meaningful cognitive sense only if this 
distinction obtains. 
The answer to either of the above questions demands a 
mapping of instrumental actions onto goals. Such a mapping 
incorporates knowledge of current existing conditions, 
available instrumental actions, and models which predict 
the results from available actions under current conditions 
The logical structure of such a mapping is presented 
in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. General Structure of Explanation 
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In the preceding schema there are two types of pre-
diction models. The first delineates ways that means 
and conditions combine to form new conditions, i.e., "If 
C. and M., then Ck. 11 These type of prediction models may 
l J 
be used in a chain, with the output of one model being the 
input to another. Ultimately, the output of this model 
type will be the input to a model of the second type. 
These latter models indicate the goal outcomes from various 
means and conditions in combination. Clearly, the dis-
tinction maintained is actor specific, since different 
actors will perceive different outcomes as goal versus con-
ditional. If such a distinction is maintained, then the 
mapping of means onto goals under given conditions involves, 
as mentioned in the last section, a complexity, viz., the 
specification Ck 1 involves a more or less long chain of 
atomic conditions and the specification M .. involves a more lJ 
or less long chain of coordinated atomic means. For ex-
ample, one might have the following chain: 
In this case, c1 and M2 yields c5 which leads to c3 with 
inaction(¢). Then c3 and M6 lead to G1 , the ultimate 
goal. Returning to Figure 9, one'finds that c1 • and M11 
yields G1 • Of course, the outcomes from c1 and M2 and 
from c5 and ¢ and from c3 and M6 would be determined from 
prediction models, knowledge of existing initial con-
ditions, and knowledge of available means. 
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Given prediction models and goals, one cognitive 
function of accounting, then, is to provide knowledge of 
existing initial conditions and available means. (This 
emphasizes the necessity of the balance sheet as popularly 
conceived.) Obviously, only relevant initial conditions 
and means are candidates for representation by the account--
ing system. And, relevant conditions and means are de-
termined by reference to prediction models that are in fact 
being used. Remember there is no concern with choice among 
or alteration of prediction models. Such choices are an 
aspect of the operation of accounting systems on the 
realized plane; discussion is therefore delayed until 
Chapter V. 
An Example. This section presents an example that is 
consistent with the generali~ed schema of explanation. This 
provides a manageable analysis of logical structure and 
will allow elucidation of some issues that were not ex-
plicitly addressed in the previous general model. Addition-
al concreteness is attained without appreciable loss of 
generalizab:Lli ty. The assumptions of the example follow: 
1. There are three distinct goals--G1 , G2 , G3 • 
2. There are only two known instrumental ways to 
reach each goal. A single "instrumental way" 
is a combination of atomic mean, M., and atomic 
condition, c . . 1 
J 
3. The relevant aspects of the situation are 
described by two atomic, initial conditions, 
c1 and C~, and by four atomic means, M1 , M2 , 
M3 , and M4 . 
4. 
5. 
Neither c1 nor C? is equivalent to G1 or G2 
or G3 or any combination of these. 
c1 is not the negation of C in part or other-
Wlse. c1 and c2 represent ~ifferent dimensions 
or properties of the current existing situation. 
Tables I through IV present a schema of the logical 
form of an explanation which, under the foregoing as-
sumptions, is necessary to allow a cognitively unhindered 
operation of the actor's decision model. Remember that 
decision models are characterized as methods of evaluating 
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alternative.goal-mean package complexes. The actor applies 
personal standards in the evaluation and arrives at a final 
plan of actj_on. 
The schema of explanation presented in the following 
tables is deductive in character. Essentially, with goals 
and prediction models specified and given available means, 
one can deduce alternative plans of action. An examination 
of Table I reveals that three distinct goals--G1 , G2 , and 
G3--have been specified by the actor. The known, relevant 
prediction models reveal that each goal can be individually 
attained in .one of two ways and that inactin ( r/J) will 
result in an unchanged state of affairs. Notice also that 
both conditions c1 and c2 currently exist. Table II 
reveals the means individually and combinationally 
available. Given all of the above, one can then deduce 
Table III and Table IV. 
One should begin with the deduction of Table III. For 
the moment accept Table II--"Means Available"--as given. 
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'I' ABLE I 
LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF EXPLANATION 
Existing Initial 
Goals Prediction Models Conditions 
If cl and Ml' then Gl cl 
If c 2 and M3' then Gl c2 
If' cl and M2' then G2 
If c2 ·and M4, then G2 
If cl and M4, then G3 
If c2 and }1[3' then G3 
If c l and C/J ' then cl 
If c2 and C/J 
' 
then c2 
TABLE II 
MEANS AVAILABLE 
Means - Combinations* Conditions 
cl c2 cl • c2 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes no no 
no yes no 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
no yes v no no 
yes v no no no 
*M1 denotes any logically possible means-combination, except 
those including M4 . 
'l'ABLE III 
MAPPING OF INDIVIDUALLY AVAILABLE 
MEANS ON OUTCOMES UNDER 
GIVEN CONDITIONS 
Potential Outcomes Existing Initial Conditions 
cl c2 
Gl Ml M3 
G2 M2 . 
G3 M4 M3 
cl 0 
c2 0 
TABLE IV 
FACTUALLY AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTAL ACTIONS 
Plans (Alternative Known, 
Courses of Action) Relevant Outcomes 
Ml Gl 
M2 G2 
M3 Gl • G3 
Ml . M3 Gl . G3 
M2 M3 Gl . G2 . G3 
0 cl . c2 
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Notice from Table II that means M1 , M2 , and M3 are indi-
vidually available under either condition c1 or c2 , while 
M4 is available (is not prevented) under c1 but is not 
available (is prevented) under condtion c2 . Inaction, 0, 
is also available under either c1 or c2 • 
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Thus far there is knowledge of (1) ways to bring about· 
each goal, (2) existing condtions, and (3) means available 
under either condition. From this knowledge one can deduce 
Table III. A generalized form 'Jf the deduction is as 
follows: 
If C, then M 
c 
•• •. M 
If C and M, then 0 
~!'· 0 
Where - M - ( (,7) , M l , M 2 , M 3 ,._.. M 4 ) 
' 0- (C 1 , c 2 , G1 , G2 , G3 ) 
The symbol "=" is followed by a 
specification of all possible and 
relevant substitution instances. 
In words, the first statement says that if condition C 
obtains then means M iB not prevented. The fourth statement 
says that if C exists and M is not prevented, then 0 is not 
prevented. By invoking the entire argument for each indi-
vidually available mean (0, M1 , M2 , M3 ) and each prediction 
model, one can derive Table III, insofar as those cells 
containing a substitution instance of M are concerned. For 
example, since c1 exists and M1 is available if c1 exists, 
M1 is available. Table 1 reveals that c1 exists. Table II 
reveals that M1 is available if c1 exists. Moreover, the 
first prediction models states that if c1 exists and M1 is 
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available, then G1 is available. Thus, Table III shows G1 
as a potential outcome insofar as c1 and M1 are concerned. 
However, there are also cells in Table III without 
entries, viz., those with a dash(--). No entry occurs in 
a cell in the event that a means is prevented (is not 
available) under a given condition. In that case, no 
necessary conclusion is possible. This results in a dash 
(--) in Table III in the appropriate cell. A discussion 
of this situation follows. 
In this example the following series of statements is 
available: 
No necessary conclusion is possible. As a result, a dash 
is placed in cell (G2 , c2 ) of Table III. Furthermore, by 
assumption (2) of this example, the lack of explicit 
mention of any other prediction models implies there are no 
other known ways to bring about the goals desired. In 
short, prediction models state all known, relevant ways to 
reach given goals. (A relevant prediction model is one 
relating goals and existing conditions.) Thus, a dash is 
also entered in cells (c1 , c2 ) and (c 2 , c1 ) of Table III. 
The dash signifies that there is no known way to achieve 
the stated outcome under the given condition, either because 
a means is prevented by a condition or no prediction model 
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is available relating a mean with some outcome under the 
given condition. 
Next consider the derivation of Table IV, which lists 
alternative plans of action and corresponding outcomes. 
Given that c1 and c2 exist, the alternative courses of 
action that are available for implementation are those 
marked by a "yes" in the column marked "C1 • c2 " in Table 
II. (For the moment take the entries in that column as 
given.) Thus, the alternative plans of action that are 
entered in the first column of Table IV are M1 ; M2 ; M3 ; M1 
and M3 ; M2 and M3 ; and 0. 
Finally, one can use Table III along with the list of 
available plans given c1 and c2 to derive the second 
("Outcomes") column of Table IV. Mechanically, one scans 
each individual column of Table III for each atomic means 
available and finds that M1 yields G1 , M2 yields G2 that 
M3 yields both G1 and G3 , and that inaction yields c1 and 
c2 . These outcomes are entered in Table IV. While M4 
will yield G3 under c1 , M4 is not in fact available due 
to existenc~ of c2 • (See Table III.) 
To derive the remaining two outcomes, "G and G " and l 3 
"G1 and G-2 and G3 ", one first searches for M1 and M3 where 
M1 is in one column of Table III and M3 is in another. 
This reveals that G1 and G3 will result from action M1 and 
M3 . Secondly, one searches similarly for M2 and M3 and 
finds that G1 and G2 and G3 are the corresponding outcomes. 
Turn now to a more formal analysis of the deduction of 
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•rable IV. Since Table III is a restatement of lznowledge 
given by prediction models, existing initial conditions, 
and individually available means under each condition, one 
can construct from that table the following positive 
statements: 
From Table 
If cl 
If c2 
If cl 
If cl 
If c2 
If cl 
If c2 
II, the 
If cl 
If cl 
If cl 
and Ml, then Gl 
and M3' then Gl 
and M2, then G2 
and M4' then G3 
and M3, then G3 
and C/J ' then c 1 
and C/J, then c2 
following assertions are available: 
and c2' 
and c2, 
and c2, 
then C/J 
then Ml 
then M2 
then M3 
then """M4 
then [,-, (M1 . 
then [M1 
then [M2 
then [""[(M1 • M2 ) · M3 ] · 
[(M1 · M2 ) v M3 Jj 
If c 1 and c 2 , then [.-v(M1/· M4 ) • (M// v M4 )} 
Where M~ denotes any means or combination 
that is factually available given c 1 and 
c2. 
What is available thus far are (1) assertions stating 
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what will result under a given condition and an available 
action, and (2) assertions stating which actions are pre-
vented and which are not prevented given the simultaneously 
existing conditions. A general form of the deduction of 
Table IV is as follows: 
1. Derivation of "Plans" column: 
If cl and C2, then M 
cl and c2 
••• M. 
Where M:=( 0; Ml; M2; M3; Ml . M3; 
2. Derivation of "Outcomes" column: 
a. Single mean, M (includes Ql): 
If C. and M, then 0 
l 
C. 
l 
M 
Where Ci _ (c 1 ; c 2 ) 
M _ (QI; M1 ; M2 ; M3 ) 
0 _ (G1 ; G2 ; G3 ; c 1 ; c 2 ) 
M2 . M3) 
b. Multiple means, Mj and M3 (exclude Ql): 
If c 1 and Mj, then 0 
If c 2 and M3 , then 0/ 
c 1 and c 2 
M. and M3 
J / 
': .O:and 0 
Where M. 
-
(Ml; M )" J 2 
0 
-
( Gl; G2) 
o"' 
-
( Gl; G3) 
After the derivation of actions and resulting out-
comes, the actor will apply his decision model in arriving 
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at a final plan of action. Of course, the actor may reject 
all alternatives or may be dissatisfied with the range of 
alternatives. In that event, the entire process would be 
repeated with a new set of goals specified. 
Thus far, there has been no mention of the logical 
structure of the process involved in the determination of 
means available. Table II reveals that M1 , M2 , and M3 are, 
individually, not prevented by either condition c 1 or c 2 . 
M4 , however, is available under c 1 but is not available 
under c 2 . In other words, c 2 prevents M4 . Moreover, since 
both c 1 and c 2 currently exist, the statements in Table II 
imply more than the results of a simple empirical investi-
gation that revealed the availability of Mi. The only 
statements that one could make as the result of such an 
investigation would be as follows: 
Ml is available 
M2 is available 
M3 is available 
M4 is not available 
But Table II includes the following ten (10) non-
temporal statements: 
If Cl, then 0 
If cl, then Ml 
If Cl, then M2 
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where Mi is interpreted as "Mi is not prevented" and --'Mi is 
interpreted as "M. is prevented." In other words, there 
l 
is an analytical separation of c 1 and c 2 . Similarly, Table 
II includes the following sj_x ( 6) statements about 
available means-combinations: 
If Cl, then~ (M1 . M2) 
If cl, then (Ml . M3) 
If Cl, then (M2 . M3) 
If c2, then (Ml . M2 ) 
If c2, then (Ml . M3) 
If c2' then (M2 . M3) 
From these 16 statements and given that c 1 and c 2 
exist, one can derive the remaining statements of Table II. 
The logical form of that derivation is as follows: 
1. The derivation of the two negative entries in 
the columns "C II and "C "· 1 2 . 
If cj, then {rv(Mi . M'') . (M. v M")} l 
If c . ' then tvM. J l 
cj 
:.~M.·{~M . . M") • (M1. v M")} l l 
Where M" :=. [any combination of means except 
those including M4 or (M1 • M2 )] 
M. = [ a 1 l - . 
cj = (c 1 
i t j 
a2] = [M4; (Ml • M2) J 
C2) 
In words, if a means is not available under a given 
condition, then any means-combination which includes the 
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unavailable means is unavailable .under that condition. This 
is the case of M4 under c2 and M1 · M2 under c1 . 
2. The derivation of the entries in column "C 1 • c 2 ": 
a. Response is "Yes" in column "C o c llo 1 2 • 
(If c1 , then M*) and (If c 2 , then M*) 
c1 v c 2 
."o.M* v M* 
••• M* 
Where M* _ (All factually possible means 
combinations) 
b. Response is "No" in column "C1 . C2 ": 
(If ci, then M v-M) and (If cj, then -M") 
ci 
c. 
J (M r.. "' v ""M) and ,.....M 
Where A . M.; (All loglcally possible means 
combinations) 
Ci::::: (Cl; C2) 
i * j 
In words (2-a) states that if a means-combination is 
available (not prevented) under either condition alone, it 
is not prevented under both conditions together. Remember 
that each C. represents a different dimension of the 
l 
situation. If C. and C. combine to form a new relevant 
l J 
dimension of the situationthat prevents M*, even though C. 
J. 
or C. alone does not, then a new dimension C is formed J n 
and would be included in the "single conditions" column of 
Table II. In the present example, there would have been a 
column labeled "C 3 ", if c1 and c 2 combined to prevent M* 
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while M* was not prevented by c1 or c2 alone. 
On the other hand, (2-b) states that if a means-
combination is prevented by one condition but allowed or 
prevented by another, then that means is prevented under 
both conditions in conjunction. In the event that, eog., 
A is prevented by c1 alone, allowed by c2 alone, but 
allowed by c1 and c2 in combination, then the statement ''If 
A 
c1 , then M" is simply incomplete. In the context of 
Table I, there would have to be a third column, "C 3", with 
" the entry "No" in the row containing M. The column 
labeled rrc 1 rr would receive no entry(-), signifying that 
no relevant statement is possible or that c1 does not 
represent the determinant level of dimension complexity. 
A point that becomes clear as a result of this syn-
tactical analysis is that, in general, the relevant con-
ditions for means determination may not be the smne as those 
relevant for outcome determination given means. Similarly, 
the means representations necessary for outcome determi-
nation through prediction models, may not be the repre-
sentation necessary for means-outcome evaluation by the 
actor's decision model. These considerations are examined 
mo~e closely in the section dealing with semantical 
analysis. 
Summary and "Practical" Examples. Thus far, the 
following cognitive functions have been determined as 
necessary to explanations on the structured plane: 
l. Determination of existing initial conditions 
from investigation. 
2. Determination of means individually and com-
binationally available. This results from use 
of nontemporal models, simple empirical 
investigation, or both. 
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3. Mapping of individually available means on out-
comes under existing initial conditions. This 
results from operation of prediction models given 
knowledge of initial conditions and individually 
available means. 
4. Listing of factually available instrumental 
actions (plans). This results from (3) and 
knowledge of available means-combinations. 
Of primary interest to this research are the junctures 
at which explanation and actor evaluation involve reference 
to real world objects and the semantical problems involved, 
especially as they concern the accounting system on the 
structured plane. The crucial elements of decision 
processes as formulated here are shown in Table V. The 
table places the cognitive functions of explanation (as 
set forth in the preceding section) within the paradigm 
of the 1971 Committee ~eport as interpreted within the 
theory of rational action. 
Table V is discussed within the context of two 
examples. Suppose the decision to be made is what de-
preciation method to use for certain property for income 
tax purposes. In this instance, the means available are 
the alternative methods of depreciation calculation. The 
determination of means available (not prevented) will 
entail both temporal and nontemporal "prediction" models. 
The tax law does specify the conditions that must be met 
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for a particular depreciation method to be available to 
the taxpayer (actor). For example, the property must, 
obviously, be depreciable; the tax law specifies the traits 
of' depreciable property. Moreover, certain classes of 
property are depreciable by methods not allowed for other 
classes. For example, "new" tangible property (excluding 
buildings) can be depreciated at higher rates than can 
"used" tangible property. And in some cases the method 
6 
allowed is dependent on the useful life of property. 
Clearly, the determination of useful life involves pre-
diction models. Then, a list of available alternatives 
and the corresponding outcomes can be constructed. In this 
example, future tax rates will partially determine the 
outcomes. Thus, prediction models are again involved. 
Finally, some alternative is chosen. 
Return to Table V. In the present example, the tax 
law provides "If, then" propositions which allow the deter-
mination of available means. The form of these propo-
sitions is, "If property X has traits Y, then methods Z 
are available." In this case, it is necessary to know 
the existing initial conditions of the relevant aspects 
(traits) of the situation (depreciable objects). Of 
course, the determination of traits (e.g., useful life) 
may involve prediction models. And prediction models will 
6 Ray M. Somerfield, Federal Taxes and Management 
Decisions (Homewood, Illinois, 1978), p. 190. 
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be necessary in the determination of future outcomes. In 
these latter two cases, it is also necessary to know the 
existing initial conditions of the relevant aspects of the 
situation. This determination of existing initial con-
ditions is shown as the first function of the accounting 
system in Table V. 
TABLE V 
COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS SERVED BY THE ELEMENTS 
OF THE PROCESS OF DECISION 
Elements of Process of 
Decision 
Accounting I Information System 
Temporal and Nontemporal 
"Prediction" Models ("If, 
then" propositions) 
Accounting I Information System 
Decision Models 
Cognitive Functions 
Served 
Determination of rele-
vant initial existing 
conditions 
Determination of means 
available 
Determination of means 
available 
Determination of 
possible outcomes 
Mapping of indj_vidu-
ally available means 
on outcomes 
Listing of alternatives 
available 
Choice or evaluation 
After determination of means available and corre-
sponding outcomes, there is necessary a listing of these 
alternatives. This may appear to be a simple processing 
of information. But what is brought out clearly is that 
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the information provided for prediction and "means-
availability" models is not necessarily the same as that 
provided for decision models through the listing of alterna-
tive means and corresponding outcomes. Even though the 
"same" objects are involved, the dimensions which are 
relevant differ depending on whether one is involved with 
determination of means and outcomes or evaluation of those 
alternative means-outcome packages. In other words, even 
though some object representation (data) may allow 
accurate prediction, it does not follow that that repre-
senation is the relevant dimension for evaluation of 
that object. 
Consider another example. Suppose the goal of an 
actor is increased productivity; this may be necessitated, 
from the point of view of the actor, due to declining 
availability of input in the face of constant or increasing 
demand for output. Suppose, furthermore that there are 
three means available as follows: 
1. Managerial employees tra~ning program. 
2. Production employees bonus program. 
3. Merger with input supplier. 
Notice that implicit in the above list are statements 
of the following form: 
108 
If C. , then M . 
l J• 
In other words, even if the determination of means availa-
ble is the result of "pure" empirical observation or 
investigation, there is, after and before investigation, 
an implicit statement that if such and such conditions 
exist then such and such means are available. Indeed, the 
form may be "If Mi, then Mi." The reason for adopting 
choice among tax methods as the first example was simply 
that a more or less clearly stated set of initial condition 
sufficient to allow certain means is given through the tax 
law. 
Continuing the present example, the next step is to 
generate outcomes from various alternative actions. Again 
it should be noted that the situation representation (data) 
necessary to allow determination of means and outcomes 
possible may be vastly different from the representation 
necessary to allow evaluation of those outcomes. For 
example, the relevant condtions for determining the availa-
bility of merger as a means might include recent govern-
mental rulings about similar mergers in the industry and 
the desires of voting stockholders of companies involved. 
The outcomes possible under merger might be contingent on 
co~petitive conditions, general economic environment, and 
rate of technological change. Finally, the way these out-
comes are represented depends on the decision model of the 
actor. 
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Semantic Analysis 
The summary of the results thus far and the provision 
of examples allow a transition to the semantic aspects of 
the process of explanation and evaluation. The question 
remains, "What are the necessary semantic characteristics 
of accounting statements?" 
Returning to Table V one finds that the primary 
functions of explanation are (1) determination of existing 
initial conditions, (2) determination of means available, 
(3) determination of possible outcomes, and (4) listing of 
alternative mean-outcome packages. In the simplest form, 
a sketch of explanation is 
1 • c. 
l 
2. If c. ' l 
3. If c. 
l 
4. Ml 
as follows: 
then M. 
and 
01 
0 
n 
J 
M.' the J ok 
One may notice the absence of statements signifying 
the determination of available means through investigation. 
However, as mentioned in the previous example, the logical 
form of such statements is equivalent to the logical form 
of prediction. Finally, remember that knowledge of con-
ditional statements, like (2) and (3) above, is assumed. 
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Thus, the accounting statements can be divided into 
two classes--(1) those that allow prediction of relevant 
means and outcomes, and (2) those that allow evaluation of 
predicted7 future outcomes resulting from various means. 
The necessary semantic characteristics of each of these 
classes is considered in turn. 
Accounting for Predictions. As prediction model 8 
relevant, the accounting statements must represent existing 
initial conditions. Moreover, to be useful to a rational 
actor, the statements must be true in a semantic sense. 
Examination of this contention is delayed until completion 
of a review of the semantic conception of truth with 
respect to sentences or statements. 
Semantics, it will be remembered, deals with coordi-
nation of empirical objects with extralogical, descriptive 
terms. And, as pointed out in.Chapter II, sentences have 
two semantical dimensions--intension and extension. In-
tension refers to the proposition expressed, while extension 
refers to truth value or empirical correspondence. More-
over, empirical correspondence is, in general, consistent 
with any number of intensions. For example, consider the 
7Evaluation of actual outcomes is addressed in 
. Chapter V. 
8one may object to the use of the terminology "pre-
diction model" when referring to statemer:ts ~;peci fying the 
condition under which a means is available now. However, 
the distinction is merely pragmatic; as shown, the logical 
form is the same for either temporal or nontemporal con-
ditional statements. 
lll 
sentence, A1--"Firm X has cash of $50,000 on May 31, 1977." 
Also, consider the three semantical systems, s1 , s 2 , and s3 
which provide the rules of designation given in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
PARTIAL RULES OF DESIGNATION FOR 
THREE SEMANTICAL SYSTEMS 
Semantical System Symb,ol 
"Firm X" 
"Cash" 
"Firm X" 
"Cash" 
"Firm X" 
"Cash~' 
Designatum 
"XYZ Corporation" 
"Bank deposit balances 
+ money orders" 
"XYZ Corporation" 
"Bank deposit' balances 
+ money orders + coin 
and currency on hand" 
"XYZ Corporation" 
"Bank deposit balances 
+ money orders + coin 
and currency on hand 
+ travelers' checks" 
Clearly, if the XYZ Corporation has bank deposits of 
$47,000, money orders of $3,000, coin and currency on hand 
of $0, and travelers• checks of $1,000, then the sentence 
A1 is true under either semantical system s1 or s2 but is 
false with respect to s3 . In other words, the extension 
and, thus empirical correspondence, of a sentence is 
determined by the semantical system in operation. In the 
above example, the term "cash" extends over a varying 
number of objects. Thus, the proposition expressed by 
sentence A1 varies. In short, then 1 the empirical 
correspondence of the sentence may vary as the objects 
referred to vary. 
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Return now to the contention that with respect to a 
rational actor's cognitive orientation process in the 
structured plane, the accounting system must produce 
semantically true statements. The reader is reminded that 
the rational actor by definition adopts an affectively 
neutral orientation toward accounting statements and that 
accounting statements, by the present interpretation of 
the analytical distinction between accounting, prediction, 
and decision models, must represent existing initial 
conditions to fulfill the requirements of prediction 
models. Thus, to add the restriction that the represen-
tations must be semantically true with respect to 
prediction models simply implies that the semantical system 
implicit in the construction of the prediction model must 
be referred to when making observations on the "real 
world." Otherwise, the predictions generated will be 
semantically true only by coincidence. 
For example, consider the following "prediction" 
model: 
"If Firm X has bank deposits +money orders 
equal toY, then Firm X has cash of Y." 
Furthermore, imagine that Firm X has bank deposits of 
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$47,000, money orders of $3000, and coin and currency on 
hand of $0 and that by summing these amounts one "predicts" 
cash of $50,000. Relative to the aforementioned prediction 
model, this statement is semantically true; but, only by 
. . d . t 9 colnCl ence, l- appears. 
It may be argued that the example is "unrepresen-
tative" especially since no prediction model is involved. 
But, as noted in footnote 8, the distinction between pre-
diction and cross-sectional models is pragmatic. The 
logical form and issues are the same. 
sider the prediction model: 
"R t+l = a + b·M t 
For example, con-
where "a" and "b" are some constants 
and "Mt" is some observable. 
Mt is an existing initial condition. Rt+l is to be 
predicted. The model may be restated as follows: 
"If a + b·Mt equals X, then. 
Rt+l equals X" 
The analogy to the previous case should be clear--
"a + b.M " is analogous to "bank deposits + money orders." 
. t 
Once again it should be noted that whether Rt+l is in 
fact obtained is a question for the next chapter, when the 
realized plane is discussed. 
~ccounting for Evaluation. Turn now to the semantic 
9rt may as a matter of fact be the case the firms 
avoid cash on hand. In that case the prediction model is 
merely succint or frugal in expression. This, however, 
draws in pragmatic issues which cloud logical exposition. 
aspects of those accounting statements which serve to 
allow evaluation of predicted future outcomes. It is 
assumed that the actor has been provided with a list of 
relevant mean-outcome combinations. The relevant 
dimensions of the alternatives may or may not be the 
dimensions that were used as inputs to or generated as 
outputs of prediction models. This "dual purposiveness" 
of accounting statements in the structured plane, viz., 
as prediction and decision model relevant, is discussed 
more fully in the final chapter of this research. 
llL! 
In the context of evaluation the distinction between 
means and goals (or relevant outcomes) must be eliminated. 
When discussing the determination of available alterna-
tives, it is helpful to maintain a distinction between 
means and outcomes. However, once a list of available 
mean-outcome packages has been providsd, then the packages 
themselveE· are the evaluated unit. The desirability of 
any action relative to· any other action i~ the relative 
desirability of the two means-outcome packages. While one 
may be inclined to view this situation in the context of 
"minuses" and "pluses" (i.e., sacrificing means and obtain-
ing consequences), such a distinction is confused. While 
the evaluation is an evaluation of future plans which 
themselves are means 2nd outcomes combinations, the 
evaluation may be along dimensions cutting across the 
prior means-outcome distinction. The distinction is useful 
only for discussion of cathectic-cognitive discrimination 
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of the actor. Moreover, the elimination of the distinction 
at this point does not militate against the use of the con-
cept of "outcomes" or "goals" in the context of the first 
stage of the actor's orientation, since at that stage the 
actor has no knowledge of how, if at all, those outcomes can 
be brought about. In short, there is no necessary weighing 
of "cost" of means against "benefits" of outcomes once po-
tential plans have been established. While there are cer-
tainly costs and benefits and while the plan chosen will, by 
definition,. have' the greatest net benefit, there is no neces-
sary attaching of costs to means and benefits to outcomes. 
That is to say, the means-outcomes distinction is eliminated. 
As decision model relevant, accounting statements 
must allow choice or evaluation of alternative courses of 
action. If the accounting statements are to be useful, the 
representations must be consistent with the dimensions 
along which the actor evaluates available alternatives. 
As with prediction models, the representations must be se-
mantically true. An example of evaluation will support 
and clarify these contentions. 
Suppose that a decision-model-relevant aspect of the 
situation is straight-line depreciation, D, calculated as 
"D == (C - V ) + L", where "C", "V", and "L" represent 
historical dollar outlay, future dollar salvage value, and 
expected service life, respectively. The accounting 
statement S, then, is "D is x dollars." As an input to a 
scheme for evaluating various alternative actions, S 
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must be consistent with the actor's decision model which, 
as discussed in Chapter III, is a means of weighting 
various standards or values of the actor in a manner which 
reflects moral values. In other words, the impact of 
alternative actions on certain standards is revealed 
directly or indirectly, fully or partially, by the magni-
tude of D. And if the actor's relative weighting of each 
standard against all other standards is to be interpretable 
by the actor, the statement, S, and all other accounting 
statements used evaluatively, must have the relationship 
to values that the actor holds according to some system or 
must allow the actor to adjust to such a relationship. 
This idea of relationship to values is made less 
vague through continuation and simplification of the 
present example. Suppose, then, that the actor has three 
standards for evaluative purposes and that available as 
aids in the evaluation of two alternatives are the account-
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corresponding to alternatives A1 and A2 , respectively. 
Si represent some dimension of A1 and A2 , which impacts on 
the values of the actor. The incorporation of these 
stCJ.tements into the evaluation is in effect a quantification 
of a value. The quantification a~ a result of any statement 
may be adjusted across values. The extent of such ad-
justment is one function of a decision model. 
For simplicity, assume D represents the only relevant 
dimension of A1 and A2 . A schematic of a decision model in 
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context o.f this example is given in Table VII. Notice that 
each value weights a given dimension differently. In 
other words, the values rank a given dimension. Moreover, 
all other dimensions would be ranked by each value and, 
thus, be ranked relative to all other dimensions along all 
values. 
TABLE VII 
SCHEMATIC OF A SIMPLIFIED DECISION MODEL 
Value Quantified Dimension D 
Weight Alternative Al Alternative A2 
L a xl x2 
M b xl x2 
N c xl x2 
More generally, then, there will be numerous 
dimensions represented from various data sources. In order 
for the actor to choose among alternatives with respect to 
some value and dimension, there must be comparability across 
alternatives. To allow this comparison, any represented 
dimension or aspect of two situations must be the "same" 
dimensions. The "sameness", if one is to avoid metaphysics, 
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must be grounded in observable, verifiable, evidential 
matter. It is necessary to have a grounding in observables. 
In other words, one semantical system must operate across 
alternatives--presumably the system of the actor or a 
system transformable to the actor's.. In short, truth in the 
semantical sense as explained earlier (See pages 110-113~ 
is necessary. 
Notice that D does not have to represent any empirical 
object "directly." For example, straight-line depreciation 
has no "direct" empirical referrent. One cannot in any 
sense observe depreciation, any more than one can observe 
specific gravity. Rather, both are mathematical calcu-
lations, the values of the variables being based on measures 
of empirical objects. 
Also, it is necessary that the actor be able to 
compare dimensions. This function of decision models is 
accomplished through differential weighting of different 
dimensions on any value, while maintaining proper weighting 
across values. Clearly, such weighting is subjective. But, 
as pointed out, comparisons within dimensions across 
alternatives demands empirically sound representations of 
dimensions. 
Summary 
This chapter has been limited to actor types who view 
accounting statements as instrumental objects. Two 
functions of those objects were examined, the predj_ctive 
and evaluative. Accounting itself operates according to 
a model which is distinct from prediction and decision 
models. 
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Goals of the actor are taken as given. The predictive 
function of accounting provides the actor with cognitive 
discrimination among instrumental objects, i.e., different 
ways of achieving certain goal relationships are specified. 
This specification involves prediction models. And, since 
prediction models are themselves instrumental objects, it 
is assumed that prediction models are specified. This 
assumption avoids infinite regress. 
Prediction models provide knowledge of how certain 
outcomes can be brought about given certain means and 
conditions. Thus, there must be knowledge of existing 
initial conditions and available means. The determination 
of available means involves models which have a logical 
form that is the same as that of prediction models. In 
short, the process of cognitive discrimination involves 
determination of the intersection of available instru-
mental actions (including inaction) and the actor's desired 
future relationships with goal objects. 
Decision models specify actor-relevant dimensions 
along which competing plans of actions can be evaluated. 
This evaluation is the final step in the decision process. 
The distinction between prediction and decision models 
allows for the possibility that the dimensions of instru-
mental actions and outcomes that are necessary for and 
a consequence of prediction models may be different from 
the dimensions relevant for evaluation of that same 
means-outcome package. Nevertheless, implicit in any 
choice is prediction of alternatives and evaluation of 
alternatives. 
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In short, the cognitive function of the planning 
function of accounting is to support the cognitive require-
ments of prediction and decision models. In the case of 
prediction models, it has been shown, the accounting model 
operates by·making selections from the observation plane 
and representing those observations in a manner consistent 
with prediction models. The consistency requirement 
demands that the accounting model embrace rules of desig-
nation relating descriptive accounting terms and empirical 
objects. And these rules must be identical to the rules 
upon which the prediction models are based or must be 
capable of transformation into those rules. 
In the case of decision models, which can in a sense 
be interpreted as including prediction models, accounting 
statements must represent action-complexes along dimensions 
consistent with the dimensions specified by the actor's 
decision model. This choice involves comparison of 
action-complexes. The comparability demands an accounting 
representation that is verifiable independent of the actor 
value(s) which requires evaluation along those dimensions. 
Otherwise, one has the untenable case that an evaluation 
proceeds along dimensions which are themselves value 
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determined, i.e., one evaluates, according to some values, 
dimensions which are determined by those values. Veri-
fiable independence is achieved by rules of designation 
which are consistent with rules of designation implicit in 
the decision models. In order to allow choice, the rules 
will necessarily be consistent across alternatives with 
respect to any dimension or will be transformable to common 
rules of designation. 
In sum, this chapter has viewed accounting models as 
a fundamental element of explanatory systems. Within this 
context and with accounting statements viewed as instru-
mental, cultural objects, this research has specified the 
necessary logical characteristics of accounting statements. 
It is not maintained that, nor examined whether, accounting 
statements do in fact possess these characteristics. 
Instead, this chapter identified those syntactical and 
semantical characteristics that accounting statements must 
possess in order for accounting to fulfill its cognitive 
function on the structured plane~ Essentially, accounting 
as a languag~ must have a clearly specified syntax and one 
or more explicit or implicit semantical systemso Without a 
ruled syntax and referential base, accounting as a cognitive 
tool fails. 
CHAPTER V 
THE REALIZED PLANE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to expand the analysis 
of the cognitive functions of accounting to include what 
has been termed the "realized plane." The fundamental 
issue is whether the logical empiricists' requirements of 
historical explanation are necessary for adequate account-
ing explanations in the realized plane. It should be noted 
that accounting is still viewed relative to a rational 
actor, as previously defined. However, this chapter does 
relax one assumption of the previous chapter; specifically, 
it is no longer assumed that prediction models are given. 
This relaxation brings issues of historical analysis to 
full light. 
The Realized Plane 
Summary of Structured Plane 
It will help to review briefly the nature of the 
actor's decision process and the related cognitive function 
of the accounting model, insofar as the structured plane 
is concerned. In its predictive function, the accounting 
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system makes selections from the observation plane in a 
manner consistent with prediction models. In other words, 
the accounting model must operate with reference to a 
semantical system that is consistent with the semantical 
system implicit in prediction models. 
The predictive function of accounting, then, is to 
provide inputs to prediction models such that a set of 
available, instrumental actions and related outcomes can 
be generated. But, in order for the actor to evaluate 
these alternatives, the plans must be represented along 
decision-model-relevant dimensions. Effecting this 
representation involves the evaluative function of account-
ing. Notice that in fulfilling this function the accounting 
model must represent future states of affairs. Obviously, 
this can be accomplished only if there are predictions 
of relevant dimensions of future situations. Thus, 
decision models and the related evaluative function of 
accounting can be viewed as encompassing prediction 
models and the predictive function of accounting. While 
it proved useful to maintain an analytical distinction 
between prediction and decision models in the previous 
ch0pter, this chapter can safely eliminate the distinction·. 
This simplification will result in no loss of general-
izability. In the present chapter the phrase "decision 
model" will be used with the understanding that a broader 
meaning is intended than in the previous chapter, viz., 
the phrase encompasses the meanings previously attached 
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attached to "prediction" and "decision" models. 
The final step in the decision process is the choice 
of a plan of action. As the above discussion and the 
previous chapter indicate, the choice of alternative plans 
of action is completely determinable in the case of a 
fully specified (and more broadly interpreted) decision 
model. The function of the accounting model, as an 
instrumental object of the actor, is to make decision-· 
model-relevant selections from the observation plane in 
a manner consistent with the semantical system of the 
decision model. 
Basic Character of the Realized Plane 
Returning to Figure 6 of Chapter IV, one finds that 
the realized plane encompasses the outcomes of implemented 
instrumental actions and that accounting operates on the 
realized plane through afferent information channels. This 
information is used by the actor to formulate new plans 
or revise old ones. 
There are three basic characteristics of afferent 
channels that are of primary importance: (1) incompletely 
specified decision models, (2) the function of control, 
and (3) the necessity of historical analysis in the first 
instance. Each of these characteristics is discussed 
in turn. 
First and foremost, the afferent channels are charac-
terized by a less than fully specified (i.e., incomplete) 
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decision model. It is no longer assumed that the account-
ing model is completely guided by the semantical system of 
the actor's decision model, since it is no longer assumed 
that the actor's decision model is actor-complete. An 
actor-complete decision model or process is a state of 
affairs wherein all currently existing conditions are 
either included in one or more true and relevant prediction 
models or are ruled irrelevant. Relevant prediction models 
are those describing the instrumental actions necessary to 
bring about all possible outcomes which are individually 
cathected by the actor. Moreover, the actor must be 
sufficiently value-oriented, i.e., the actor must have 
stated values and choose accordingly. An actor-complete 
decision model was illustrated in the previous chapter. 
Now an incomplete process is assumed. The aspect of in-
completeness which is under analysis in this chapter is 
revealed shortly. In any event, the actor is unable, due 
to the incompleteness, to specify an accounting-model-
relevant semantical system. Notice that an actor-complete 
decision process is not necessarily a state of complete 
certainty, since a prediction model may specify an instru-
mental action that will possibly bring about two or more 
individually cathected outcomes with equal or unequal 
probabilities. 
The second characteristic of the afferent channels 
is the accounting function of control of the decision 
process itself. Due to the actor-incomplete decision model, 
the actor is faced with indecision as to future courses 
of action. This indecision can arise from two sources. 
First, there can be :Lndecision as a result of con-
flicting values of the actor. In terms of the previous 
chapter, such indecisi.on can be described as an actor's 
inability to specify the relative weights that should be 
assigned to the actor-specific values. Secondly, there 
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can be indecision because the consequences of action cannot 
be determined. In terms of the previous chapter, such 
indecision can be described as the lack of actor-relevant 
prediction models. The accounting function of control is 
examined in light of this second source of indecision. 
The lack of a completely specified decision model also 
implies the third basic characteristic of the accounting 
process--the necessity of an historical analysis in the 
first instance. Without instruments of cognitive dis-
crimination, the actor cannot act rationally. In other 
words, the situation lacks structuring. The purpose of 
control is to eliminate this predictive incompleteness. 
In order to effect this purpose, there must be an inves-
tigation of the past, i.e., an historical analysis. Support 
for and clarification of this contention is provided in 
the following section. 
Rational Action Paths, Deviations, 
and Event Selection 
In sum, the cognitive function of the accounting model 
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with respect to the realized plane is to provide an 
historical analysis that will allow control over the 
d . . l ec1s1on process. Stated in another way, the efferent-
channel function of accounting is to select and represent 
events such that deviations from the "rational action 
path" are corrected. A discussion in terms of the concept 
of "rational action path" will place the issues of this 
chapter in clear relief. 
The schematic representation of the concept of 
rational action path is given in Figure 10. The schematic 
represents the results of the structured plane operation 
of the actor's decision model and the related accounting 
model. Assuming a fully specified decision process, the 
C?-Ccounting model's function is to make observations accord-
ing to the semantical system of that decision process. Th0 
final result of the decision and accounting model operatiolJ 
is the selection of a plan of instrumental action. In 
other words, a rational action path (RAP) is determined. 
The accounting function of control implies deviations 
from this rational action path. The first question that 
arises is whether a deviation has obtained. The second 
question is how to correct any deviations. The two are 
closely related and the solution to both of these queries 
1 It should be noted that control over the decision 
process implies control over that which the decision 
process itself controls, such as the performance of sub-
ordinates (object-actors). 
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is a function of the accounting (control) model. 
Actor Rational Action Path 
(Plan of instrumental action) 
Desired 
Outcome 
Time-----~ 
Figure 10. Rational Action Path 
Before proceeding with this discussion, one simplify-
ing assumption is made. It is assumed that the actor's 
values and the relative weighting of those values remain 
unchanged. In other words, the deviation from the rational 
action path is not a result of the actor's desiring a new 
goal relationship, all other· things the same. Indeed, as 
the only source of deviation, the change in an actor's 
valuation system could be examined within. the context of 
the previous chapter. Thus, the assumption that such value 
changes do not take place does not result in loss of sub-
stantive content. 
Return now to a consideration of the two "control 
queries." First, it is shown that an historical analysis 
is necessary to the solution of these queries. Then, this 
research turns to the main question of this chapter, viz., 
What are the necessary cognitive characteristics of the 
accounting model in light of the requirement of historical 
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analysis as fundamental to the control function? 
A schematic representation of the control problem is 
given in Figure 11. Actual actionshave deviated from the 
rational action path. Discovery of this deviation, solution 
of the first control query, must be the result of com-
parison of actual instrumental actions relative to the 
original rational action path. This comparison is illus-
trated in Figure 11 by the points "a" and "a,...". Notice 
that there is comparison to the original rational action 
path. However, the solution to the second control query, 
how to correct the deviation, may require more knowledge 
than that provided by observation of the actual instru-
mental actions and the original RAP. The reason of the 
original RAP will not serve as a device for correction of 
some deviations is simple--the RAP will change any time 
there is a deviation not enco~passed in the original plans. 
This type of deviation implies a prediction model error of 
some sort, since it is. assumed that the valuation system 
of the actor is unchanged. The predictive error may have 
arisen from (1) a prediction model which is insufficient 
relative to the observed deviation, or (2) an input repre-
sented in a manner inconsistent with the semantical system 
of the prediction model. For simplicity it is assumed that 
there is no error of the second type. Thus, the predictive 
error is a result of insufficient prediction models, in-
cluding therein the associated .semantical system. There-
fore, since RAP's are the result of prediction models 
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(holding actor values constant), it follows that the 
control process, in certain deviation correction 
situations, must correct prediction models. Otherwise, 
there is no justification for realized plane control models. 
Actor 
Time > 
Figure 11. Deviations from the Rational Action Path 
· In order to clarify the foregoing discussion, consider 
the argument that the p.rediction model is ·correct and that 
the deviation correction process is a matter of adjusting 
parts into a coordinated whole. Such an argument seems 
particularly forceful if one has in mind the control of 
some mechanical process or a process wherein persons are 
viewed as mechanical parts of that process. But this still 
leaves open the following question--"According to what 
model are the adjustments made?" If such a model is known, 
then that model, by definition, _is part of the original 
rational action path. In other words, one has the same 
scenario as in the discussion of the structured plane. 
Thus, what is admitted in the discussion of the realized 
plane is the possibility of deviations which cannot be 
corrected relative to the original RAP. This, then, 
implies discovery of a new RAP, i.e., adjustment or 
correction of prediction models themselves. 
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In sum, the discovery of deviations is a relatively 
simple process. Observations are made on actual actions 
(or intermediate outcomes) in a manner consistent with the 
original semantical system. However, deviations not en-
compassed by models which are a part of the original RAP 
will demand an historical analysis. In contrast to the 
structured plane, there must be discovery of (potential) 
RAP's. This is the fundamental distinction between 
planning and control. The structured plane is character-
ized by complete decision processes, while the realized 
plane is characterized by incomplete processes. Planning 
assumes completeness, while control demands discovery of 
causes of deviations from plans in order to eliminate 
incompleteness. 
Return to Figure ll. Suppose an actor is discovered 
at point "a" " when the proper position is point "a" accord-
ing to the original RAP. The first question that must be 
asked is whether point "a"' " is encompassed by the original 
RAP. If answered in the affirmative, then a "new" RAP 
would emerge in light of "a/ "· On the other hand, "a'" 
may not be encompassed by the original RAP. In that event, 
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a new RAP must be discovered. Thj_s discovery may be thought 
of as the selection of prediction models from an inventory 
of such models. However, in order to choose some model(s), 
there must be an analysis of the reasons "a_... " carne about 
instead of "a". Discovering such reasons characterizes 
historical analysis and will presumably provide a basis 
for choosing relevant prediction models. In other words, 
discovering why "a,... " obtained is actor-relevant only if 
the reasons allow choice among prediction models that will 
provide the actor with a new cognitive orientation (as 
discussed in Chapter IV), allowing the formulation of 
new plans. 
Cognitive Requirements of 
Historical Analysis 
, In summary, the accounting process of control in-
volves correcting or adjusting the decision process through 
an historical analysis directed toward the discovery or 
selection of relevant prediction models. The questions 
addressed in the remainder of this research revolve around 
the cognitive requirements of accounting-control expla-
nations. Because of the similarity between this question 
and the questions of the cognitive requirements of 
historical analysis in general, this research begins by 
examining the requirements of historical analysis as set 
forth by logical empiricists. The interest of these 
philosophers of science in the area of historical analysis 
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parallels the concern of this research. For example, 
consider the following quotation from Ernest Nagel: 
It is often maintained that the natural sciences 
are nomothetic, whereas history (in the sense of 
an account of events) is idiographic; and it is 
claimed in consequence that the logic and conceptual 
structure of historical explanations are funda-
mentally different from those of the natural sciences. 
It is my aim here to examine this and related issues 
in the logic of historical analysis.2 
Also, consider this statement by Nicholas Rescher: 
The claim is frequently made that the mode of 
explanation to be found in history differs radi-
cally and fundamentally from the types of expla-
nation'found in the natural or social sciences. 
This difference is said to lie in the fact that 
history, unlike science, must always deal with 'the 
description of a situation or state of affairs 
which is unique.' It is argued that the exclusive 
objects of historical understanding are unique, 
particular, concrete events: the historian, it is 
contended, is primarily concerned with describing 
and analyzing the unique features of his data, 
unlike the scientist who looks to the generic. 
It is the thesis .•. that such a claim 
regarding history (which, properly understood, 
contains a large measure of truth) cannot, without 
severe qualifications, survive objections which 
can be brought against it.3 
Essentially, the question posed in the last part of 
this research is whether accounting must be viewed as 
patently non-scientific in its role of providing an account-
of-events. Notice that the previous chapter constructed a 
paradigm of accounting explanation that was consistent with 
2Ernest Nagel, "The Logic of Historical Analysis," 
Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigel 
and May Brodbeck (New York, 1953), p. 688. (Emphasis 
added.) 
3Nicholas Rescher, Essays in Philosophical Analysis 
(Pittsburgh, 1969), p. 193. 
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the logical empiricists' paradigm of scientific expla-
nation. In the present chapter, however, this research 
examines the plausible alternative that, due to account-
ing's critical function of control and the resulting 
necessity of historical explanations, accounting-control 
explanations are fundamentally unlike scientific 
explanations. 
This research proceeds by first examining the logical 
empiricists' paradigm of historical explanation, a paradigm 
which is consistent in all fundamental aspects with 
scientific explanation. Then, counter-arguments to that 
paradigm are examined. Finally, the requirements of 
accounting-control explanations in the realized plane are 
set forth. 
The Paradigm of Explanation 
General Laws in Historical Explanation 
The paradigm of explanation held by logical empiri-
cists finds its most lucid exposition in the locus 
classicus, "The Function of General Laws in History" by 
Carl Hempel. It is maintained that in order to explain 
some event (or, more precisely, a statement about some 
attribute(s) of some event), one must identify the causes, 
C., of that event, E. In the words of Hempel: 
l 
Now the assertion that a set of events--say of 
the kinds c1 , c2 , ... , en--have caused the event 
to be explalned, amounts to the statment that 
according to certain general laws, a set of 
events of the kinds mentioned is regularly 
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accompanied by an event of kind E. . • In 
history as anywhere else in empirical science, 
the explanation of a phenomenon consists in 
subsuming it under general empirical laws; and 
the criterion of its soundness is . . whether 
it rests on empirically well confirmed 
assumptions concerning intitial conditions and 
general laws.4 
In other words, an explanation is constituted by a 
logically valid, empirically sound argument. A schematic 
of the basic form of explanation is given in Figure 12.5 
Logical 
Deduction 
E 
c 
n Statements of AnteJ 
cedent Conditions Explanans 
General Laws 
Description of the l 
Empirical Phenome- 1 ~Explanandum 
non to be Explaine~ 
Figure 12. Logical Form of Explanation 
In the context of this research, the empirical phe-
nomenon to be explained is some deviation, E, from original 
plans which is correctible only upon discovery of the 
causes of the deviation, C. 
4carl Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in 
History", Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner 
(Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), pp. 345 and 353. 
5 From Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of 
Explanation," Readings in the Philosophy of Sc1ence, 
ed. Herbert Feigel and May Brodbeck (New York, 1953), p. 322. 
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The general laws are interpreted as models which state 
that conditions C. are regularly accompanied by deviations 
l 
E. It is assumed that in the structured plane all relevant 
prediction models are specified; but, in the realized plane 
such "structuring" is necessary, i.e., prediction models 
must be discovered. 
Before moving on to the next topic, it should be 
emphasized that the form of explanation maintained by the 
logical empiricists is identical to that put forth by this 
research in the discussion of the structured plane. In 
that earlier discussion it was assumed that a fully speci-
fied deductive system was available. At that point, the 
nonlogical terms were "means", "conditions", and "outcomes." 
Now, the terms "means" and "conditions" are replaced by 
"causes" or antecedent conditions, while plan-deviating out-
comes are the events to be explained. This correspondence 
between the logical form of prediction in the structured 
plane and explanation ·in the realized plane is not 
surprising when one recognizes that 
. the same formal analysis . . applies to 
scientific prediction as well as to explanation. 
The difference between the two is pragmatic. If 
E is given, i.e., if we know that the phenomenon 
described by E has occurred, and a suitable set 
of statements c1 , c2 , .... , C:k·9 L1 ; L2 , ... , L is 
provided afterwards, we speak or explanatioH of 
the phenomenon in question. If the latter 
statements are given and E is derived prior to 
the occurence of the phenomenon it describes, we 
speak of a prediction. It may be said therefore, 
that an explanation is not fully adequate unless 
its explanans, if taken account of in time, could 
have served as a basis for predicting the 
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phenomenon under consideration. 6 
This last quotation brings to light the final question 
addressed in this research--Are accounting explanations in 
the structured plane and the realized plane logically 
identical and distinguishable only along some pragmatic 
dimension? Or, is there some logical difference between 
the two? The question is especially interesting if one 
recognizes that the discussion of the structured plane 
simply assumed the logical form now under question. Thus, 
the final part of this research can be seen as a critical 
examination of that assumption. Earlier in this chapter, 
it was argued that the planning-control bifurcation is, 
in a logical sense, untenable unless it is assumed that 
relevant prediction models (general laws) are pre-specified 
in the structured but not in the realized plane. The 
question which arises is whether these models are necessary 
to the control function of accounting. If answered in the 
affirmative, then there is no logical difference between 
adequate planning and control explanations. If answered 
in the negative, then this research offers a possible 
logical difference between planning and control expla-
~ations, since such an answer affirms a logical distinction 
maintained by some historians between "scientific" (planning) 
and "historical" (control) explanations. In any event, the 
potential difference between planning and control 
6Hempel and Oppenheim, "Logic", pp. 322-323. 
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explanation--knowledge of general laws in one case, the 
need for discovery in the other--gives credibility to the 
assertion that planning and control explanations are 
pragmatically different and that the distinction is not 
arbitrary. 
Rational Reconstruction, Explanation 
Sketches, and Principles of Adequate 
Explanation 
In sum, then, the logical empiricists hold that 
explanation, historical or otherwise, involves reference 
to empirically valid general laws and the deductive form 
of argument. However, this paradigm is not held to be an 
exact duplication of the explanations provided by his-
torians, or physical scientists for that matter. Instead, 
these philosophers are reconstructing in full the logical 
structure of the explanations actually provided by 
historians, social scientists, and others. For example, 
one might explain the collapse of a city street by stating 
that the sewers were very old and had collapsed some time 
ago; and that as a result the underlying road bed had been 
washed away by recent heavy rains. Clearly, the argument 
as stated does not logically entail the collapse of the 
city street. There may well be other streets that have not 
collapsed that are subject to the conditions mentioned. 
Hempel describes this sort of "explanation" as follows: 
What the explanatory analyses of historical 
events offer is, then, in most cases not an 
explanation • . , but something 
be called an explanation sketch. 
consists of a more or less vague 
the laws and intitial conditions 
that might 
Such a sketch 
indication of 
considered as 
relevant, and it needs "filling out" in order 
to turn into a full-fledged explanation.7 
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Nonetheless, the relevant intital condtions or causes 
that are indicated by the "sketch" must be empirical in 
nature. For example, to explain that the previously 
mentioned street collapsed because of the "destiny of 
roads" or the "hand of historical justice" would be a 
psuedo-expl~nation, not an explanation (sketch). The 
psuedo-explanation provides no direction to a "data-
collector" or empirical investigator. 8 
The principles of adequate explanation that can be 
distilled from the last two sections are as follows: 
1 • 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
The explanans must allow deduction of the 
explanandum. 
There must be general laws and these laws must 
be required for the derivation of the 
explanandum. 
The explanans.must have empirical content; this 
condition must hold if some empirical phenomenon 
is being explained. This is the condition of 
"verifiability in principle" that was discussed 
in Chapter II. 
9 The explanans must be true. 
An example which meets these requirements of expla-
nation follows. Suppose it is observed that a business 
7 Hempel, "General Laws," p. 351. 
8Ibid. 
9 Hempel and Oppenheim, "Logic," pp. 321-322. 
firm's actual direct labor efficiency ratio (units pro-
duced .;. hours of direct labor) is 4 to l while the 
standard or planned ratio is 5 to l. Leaving aside the 
question of the desirability, from some actor's point of 
view, of expending the effort to determine the cause of 
this deviation from standard (which raises similar issues 
but in a different context), one might provide the 
following explanation of this deviation: 
1. Expl anans: 
a. Initial or antecedent conditions: 
Industry A has suffered a series of 
localized strikes in a disperse area. 
This firm has not been the object of 
such a strike and is in industry A. 
b. General law: 
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If an industry is subjected to localized 
strikes, any firm which is not itself 
subject to such a strike will nonethe-
less experience a decline in productivity 
if the firm is in the industry subject 
to those strikes. 
2. Explanandum: This firm has experienced declining 
productivity. 
If one returns to the four conditions of adequate ex-
planation given earlier, it can be seen that the above 
explanation is adequate, assuming that the general law and 
antecedent conditions are true. The critical question to 
be dealt with is whether general laws are indeed necessary 
to historical explanations. 
Before beginning the examination of this critical 
issue, one overriding distinction between the scientist and 
the historian can be made. The scientist has as his object 
the formulation of general laws. The historian, on the 
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other hand, uses general laws (or, generalizations) as the 
10 
means for explaining the "facts. 11 'rhe accountant appears 
to hold a position similar to that of the historian. 
Returning to the example of the declining labor productivi-
ty; one can view-the general law as a means, not an end, 
of the accountant. The social scientist would, however, 
quite probably consider it his task to formulate such laws. 
Notice that this distinction does not argue against general-
izations in historical accounts; indeed, it assumes such 
generalizations. 
Event Selection and Explanation 
The arguments for and against general laws in history 
revolve around one pervasive question--What is the histori-
an 1 s principle of event selection? In other words, what 
attributes of events does a historian admit as relevant 
and why? Clearly, not all attributes can be recorded and 
laid down in an historical account. In the words of 
John Dewey: 
All historical analysis is necessarily selective. 
Since the past cannot be reproduced in toto and 
lived over again this principle might seem too 
obvious to mention. But it is of importance 
because its acknowledgment compels attention to 
the fact that everything in the writing of history 
depends upfn the principle used to control 
selection. 1 
10Nicholas Rescher 1 pp. 196-197. 
11John Dewey, "Historical Judgments," The Philosophy 
of History in Our Time, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (Garden City, 
New York, 1959~p:-T67. 
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The analogy to accounting is clear--What is and is not 
relevant to control-explanations? What shall be accounted 
for and what shall be left unrecorded? Logical empiri-
cists maintain that four principles of event selection are 
necessary to provide sound explanations--truth, empirical 
content, non-superfluous general laws, and inference of 
explanandum from explanans. This has already been reviewed. 
This section, then, examines some arguments that general 
laws are unnecessary to adequate explanation and, thus, as 
event-selection devices. It should be noted that the 
requirements of truth, inference, and empirical content are 
generally accepted. 
The most lucid and cogent argument that general laws 
are unnecessary to historical explanation is provided by 
Michael Scriven. 12 Scriven distinguishes three elements 
of explanation--(1) accuracy, (2) relevancy~ and (3) ade-
quacy. Each of these is examined in turn in order to 
clarify Scriven's argument against the necessity of general 
laws in history. 
The accuracy of an explanation deals with the truth 
of and the corresonding evidence for the assertions made 
through the explanans and explanadum. In the context of 
the preceding example, the truth of the assertion of 
declining productivity would be involved. Notice that 
12Michael Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Histori-
cal Explanations," Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner 
(Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), pp. 443-475. 
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(accounting) explanations can be more or less accurate and 
yet be true in all cases. For exa~ple, the statements 
that productivity is declining and that productivity is 
declining at the rate of X% can both be true. In any 
instance, the degree of accuracy is a choice problem 
analyzable according to the method set forth in this re-
search. Accuracy, while important, is not the fundamental 
.issue here. 
The relevance of an explanation involves the kind of 
explanation offered. This is a context-bound concept. 
Accountants are familiar with this aspect of explanation 
through the near-maxim of "different cost for different 
purposes." As another example, suppose that the proferred 
explanation for the declining productivity was that the 
direct laborers had experienced a declining motoneuron 
response time which, according to some general law, is 
concomitant with declining productivity. This explanation 
might well be irrelevant to the solution of the problem at 
hand, even though it is true or accurate. 
The final element of explanation specified by 
Scriven is the adequacy of the explanation in its role of 
explanation. It is disagreement about the required grounds 
of adequate explanation, Scriven maintains, that separates 
"covering-law" theorists (those advocating general laws as 
necessary to explanation) and those disputing those theo-
rists. All reflective persons will, presumably, agree that 
the grounds for accuracy and relevancy of an explanation lie 
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in evidential matter and fitness-for-purpose, respectively. 
But cannot the grounds for an adequate explanation and the 
adequate explanation itself be examined separately in a 
manner similar to a separation of an assertion and the 
evidence for that assertion? For example, suppose that 
as an explanation of declining productivity one stated the 
following: The declining productivity is due to the 
localized strikes throughout the industry even though none 
of this firm's plants have experienced strikes. Assuming 
relevancy and accuracy, the question is whether the 
explanation is adequate. This leads to the fundamental 
question: Are general laws necessary for justification? 
In this example it may appear obvious that to defend the 
above assertion as adequate one would offer the general 
law connecting widely disperse, localized strikes and 
worker's declining productivity; the question is whether 
some other grounds in certain instances might be sufficient 
to justify an explanation. , In Scriven 1 s words: "Once 
we remove from an explanation's back the burden of its own 
proof we are in a better position to see the criteria for 
judging both. 1113 
The question raised here is important and, fortunate-
ly, resolvable, at least in the context of this research. 
Suppose the following explanation form: 
If C, then E 
13scri ven, "Truisms," p. 451. 
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c 
•·. E 
In words, there is general law stating that C regularly 
accompanies E and there is a statement that C has ~btained. 
It can thus be concluded that E obtained. 
But according to Scriven, the explanation could be 
stated as: 
.· • E 
And if someone asked why C explains E, the response would 
be as follows: 
Because, if C, then E. 
This leads to the position that explanation is trivial to 
obtain, since if one wishes to explain any event, E, 
then one could proceed as follows: 
If ,-.J( ~ E ) then E 
rJ(r~E) 
.• • E 
In other words, double negation would provide adquate ex-
planation. Clearly, this does provide a logically correct 
(or, deductively valid) explanation. But what purpose 
does it serve? 
One can, and Scriven does, produce explanations in 
history that are similarly "trivial", i.e., that approach 
a statement of a single instance in a general form. For 
example, consider the following explanation of why Cortes 
sent out a third expedition to Baja California after two 
failures: 
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1. General Law: 
"All confident people with Cortes' background 
of experience, seeking very great wealth, 
undertake any venture involving the hazards 
of this one, which offers very great wealth. 
2. Initial Conditions: 
"The third voyage envisioned by Cortes 
involved the hazards that it involved and 
offered very great wealth." 
"Cortes was confident and had Cortes' back-
ground of experience and was seeking very 
great wealth. 11 14 
Scriven's argument, then, is that if one demands a 
deductive model explanation but no general laws are known, 
then one is forced to provide trivial explanations. How-
ever, the argument confounds two concepts--justification 
of an explanation and the justification of deduction. 
One can deduce from the statements, "For all X, if X 
is A then X is B" and "This X is A", the statement "This 
X is B." This involves operations on statements; and one 
would presumably invoke the rule of inference, modus 
ponens, if one were required to justify the inference. 15 
The question that arises is whether it is consistent in 
the use of language, i.e., unconfused, to say that an 
explanation that has the deductive form is justified since 
it has that form. The answer is negative. Instead one 
could say the inference is valid since the form of the 
argument is the same as that required by the rule of modus 
~ 4Ibid., p. 454. 
15This and other rules of inference are derived in 
most texts on symbolic logic. For example, see Irving M. 
Copi, Symbolic Logic, 4th ed. (New York, 1973), p. 32. 
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ponens. The question as to whether the explanation, in 
contradistinction to its form, is justified seems to carry 
no meaning unless one has relevancy (which can be inter-
preted to encompass the "empirical content" requirement of 
logical empiricists), accuracy (truth), or the supporting 
1 1 . . d 16 genera aw ln mln • 
Thus if general laws are known, they appear to be 
necessary to justify explanation. Yet, what about those 
cases where no relevant (fit-for-purpose) general laws are 
known, but an explanation is nonetheless required? A 
second argument against general laws in explanation employs 
the assumption that no relevant general laws are available 
and that the purpose of explanation is something such as 
"getting on with the story • 11 For example, suppose someone 
is asked to explain why he is limping. And the explanation 
given is that the injured party was leaving from his home 
when he tripped at the top of the stairs because he was 
unaccustomed to his new shoes. This resulted in injury 
to his right kneecap and the limp. 
Suppose the above explanation is satisfactory to the 
questioner. Certainly there are no general laws. And 
it.appears that any "filling out" of this 11 explanation 
sketch" would indeed move toward the trivial in the sense 
16Adapted from May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, 
and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," Readings in the Philosophy of 
th~ Social Sciences, ed. May Brodbeck (London, 1968), 
pp. 383-385. 
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illustrated earlier. In other words, it is not generally 
the case that persons with new shoes trip and injure 
themselves such· that they limp afterwards. An explanation 
in terms of general laws would probably involve reference 
to physical laws and be irrelevant to the questioner, 
while any deductive form explanation that was relevant 
would probably become trivial. 
It is clear that the above explanation of the limp is 
adequate but without general laws. It quite simply serves 
its purpose. Such explanations are encountered daily. 
They are common-sense explanations. There are no relevant 
17 general laws--none are desired, none are sought. 
But what can be said about control explanations for 
the rational actor? In this case the purpose of the 
explanation is not simply to provide a description of 
what happened, but rather to provide an explanation which 
will allow correction of some undesirable situation. 
There must be a setting forth of corrections between 
various (corrective) actions and outcomes. In other words, 
prediction is necessary. And prediction involves general 
statements (or laws) connecting various events, actions, 
and states of affairs. 
Of course, generality is a matter of degree. And, as 
previously pointed out, general laws are, to accountants, 
17For a more detailed treatment of common sense in 
history see J. H. Hexter, The History Primer (New York, 
1971). 
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means of explanation not ends in themselves. What remains 
to be shown is that such laws are necessary as event 
selection devices. The argument is that some event 
selection devices are necessary, that to provide predictive 
explanations one must show connection among events, actions, 
and state of affairs, and, finally, that general laws serve· 
these purposes. 
First, examine the case where no principle of event 
selection is maintained. Such a proposal has been put 
forth under the rubric of "events approach." Essentially, 
the proponents of this approach to accounting argue that 
accountants should avoid the selection problem by recording 
events without "aggregation." The logical extreme of this 
approach reveals its hopelessness. Suppose some event is 
to be recorded. The question is which attributes are to 
be noted and which are to be omitted. Any event can be 
described without limit unless some selection criterion is 
imposed. In schematic· form, one would en6ounter the 
following data set for n events at time t where x attri-
butes are identifiable: 
•. 
• 
E. 
.l.X 
E. 
nx 
Of course, there is no logical reason for limiting 
attributes. And, over time, a time subscript must be added 
since a similar event may take place at different points 
in time. For example, one dollar spent on commodity X 
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at time t might be encoded as "$lt---;:,.Xt"' while one dollar 
spent on a similar commodity X at time t + 1 might be 
encoded at "$lt+r~Xt+l", and so on. Moreover, since 
time is infinitely divisible, the events-approach implies 
an infinite data set. 
Thus, it is not a question of whether selectivity 
is necessary but what selection criterion is necessary. 
And, as pointed out earlier, the question is answerable 
only if some purpose is assumed. The purpose of expla-
nation in the 6ontext of this research is prediction. Pre-
diction involves generalization of some degree if one is to 
avoid the problem of the events approach, i.e., an infinite 
data set. In other words, certain attributes of events are 
ruled irrelevant while others are ruled relevant in the 
sense of showing connection among events. Of course, not 
all connections are relevant to control in a purposive-
action sense. Returning to the paradigm of rational 
action brings out these points clearly. 
The rational actor is faced with a deviation from the 
RAP. This deviation is deemed serious enough to demand 
investigation of its cause with the general goal of cor-
rection or adaptation. The situation wherein prediction 
models (general laws) which allowcgrrection of the situation 
are available· has been fully discussed under the heading of 
the structured plane. Now, however, the situation posited 
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is that no such models are known. Thus, an historical 
analysis is needed which results in an explanation that 
provides a cognitive orientation for the actor. Corrective 
actions and results are displayed allowing choice according 
to some decision model. Notice that this characterization 
of cognitive orientation is a description of general laws, 
or statements that ". • a set of events of the kinds 
mentioned is regularly accompanied by an event of kind E." 18 
And the explanation cannot be merely trivial statements of 
the initial ·conditions and the consequent in general form 
since the generalization also operates as an event 
selection device. 
But, the question remains--How do these unknown laws 
operate as event selection devices? The situation faced in 
the realized plane demands selection of a prediction model 
(or general law) that will in·turn direct the accountant 
to relevant events for purposes of deviation correction. 
Generalizations are needed to allow selection of relevant 
events, but these general laws are unknown. Thus, in order 
to avoid the infinite data set problem of the event 
approach, there must be some model or procedure for choosing 
among prediction models. It is assumed that there exists 
an inventory of prediction models from which one chooses 
a model relevant to the problem at hand on the basis of 
evidence as to the sources or causes of the deviation. 
18 Hempel, "General Laws," p. 345. 
The "inventory assumption" accords with the view of 
prediction models as instruments of the accountant, not 
goals toward which an accountant strives. 
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At this point the fundamental distinction between the 
accounting model's function of planning and control· can 
be drawn. In its planning function, the accounting model 
simply selects and represents those events specified by 
the semantical system of the actor's decision model. How-
ever, in its control function, the accounting model has the 
broader and more complex task of specifying procedures for 
selecting prediction models. The nature of such procedures 
is problematic, involving issues of induction, and is 
beyond the scope of this research. However, there is the 
requirement that the completed control explanation allow 
prediction, or specification of courses of action, which 
allow correction of observed deviations. Thus, the thesis 
put forth here is that planning and control explanations 
are identical in final form. The difference between the 
two is one of degree of knowledge or cognitive orientation 
prior to data collection efforts of the accountant. The 
planning-control distinction attains force only with 
re~pect to the amount of direction provided by relevant 
semantical systems. 
Summary 
The question addressed in this chapter was whether 
accounting-control explanations must exhibit those 
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characteristics maintained by logical empiricists as 
necessary to adequate explanation of empirical phenomenon. 
According to these philosophers, explanation must (1) con-
form to some logically valid argument form which allows 
deduction of the phenomenon to be explained; (2) include 
nonsuperfluous general laws in the explanans, (3) have 
empirical content, and (4) be true. 
In Chapter IV it was assumed that general laws 
(prediction models) were available. Also, due to the 
acceptance of the 1971 AAA Committee's distinction among 
accounting, prediction, and decision models, accounting 
statements are accepted as observation on empirical 
objects. Moreover, it was shown that, in order to allow 
a cognitively unhindered operation of a rational actor's 
decision process; accounting statements must be semantical-
ly true. Thus, in Chapter IV requirement (2) from above 
was assumed, requirement (3) was accepted as necessary for 
accounting to operate in its domain, and requirement 
(4) was found to be a necessary feature of accounting 
statements with respect to a rational actor. Finally, the 
requirement of logical validity merely emphasizes the 
necessity of clearly defined rules for operation on 
statements such that prediction models and accounting 
statements can be restated in a form useful for the rational 
actor, viz., in the form of available alternatives and 
concomitant outcomes. 
' In Chapter V, it was no longer assumed that relevant 
prediction models, devices directing the accountant to 
relevant aspects of the empirical domain, are available. 
Actions have deviated from the "rational action path 11 
and, relative to the state of affairs as a result of this 
deviation, there is a void of instruments (prediction 
models) necessary to an actor's achievement of cognitive 
discrimination. Thus, the question arises--Are general 
laws necessary to explanation in the realized plane? 
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It was found that the completed explanation of the 
accountant must involve generalized prediction models if 
(1) the rational actor's need for cognitive discrimination 
is to be served, i.e., the accounting statements are to 
be useful to a rational actor, and (2) the infinite data 
set problem is to be avoided. In other words, the 
alternative to accepting general laws is to provide the 
user an infinite data set; and, if usefulness to a 
rational actor is accepted as a criterion for accounting 
statements, then general laws must have predictive force 
(provide cognitive orientation). 
In sum, then, the minimal requirements which necessi-
tate the referencing of non-trivial prediction models when 
providing explanations in the realized plane have been 
identified. Moreover, since only one assumption from 
Chapter IV was relaxed and that assumption is now accepted 
in this chapter, it follows that all requirements found 
to be necessary to accounting explanation in the structured 
plane are also necessary in the realized plane. In short, 
all the requirements of the logical empiricists are 
necessary in either case. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AVENUES 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by stating the research question 
and s~1marizing the fundamental research assumptions. 
Then, the method of analysis is reviewed, followed by a 
summary of the analysis and a statement of conclusions. 
Finally, certain implications and avenues for further 
research are examined. 
Research Question 
This research poses the following question: What 
are the necessary and fundamental features of the knowledge 
that accounting provides in its role of aiding reasoned 
action? 
Fundamental Assumptions 
The following fundamental assumptions permeate this 
research: 
1. Accounting serves an informative function. 
This assumption is inherent in the research 
question. While accounting may serve any number 
of purposes, such as "socially optimal" resource 
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allocation, it is the informative function of 
accounting in serving those purposes that 
interests this research. 
2. Accounting is the tool of rational a6tors. 
157 
This assumption is also inherent in the research 
question, since accounting is viewed as aiding 
reasoned action. Indeed, in order to clearly 
explicate the meaning of "reasoned action" and 
"informative functions, 11 it is nee e ssary to define 
a rational actor. Essentially, a rational actor 
bases decisions on factual connections between 
actions and outcomes. For example, if a rational 
actor desired to encourage "socially opt:Lmal" 
resource allocation through the selective choice 
of accounting system requirements, the choice 
would be based on factual connections between 
accounting statements resulting from such systems, 
the actions of users of those statements, and the 
resource allocations resulting from those actions. 
Of course, the informative function of accounting 
might be more direct. For example, accounting 
data might provide certain input necessary to the 
actor's dec~sion regarding choice of accounting 
systems for purposes of "socially optimal" 
resource allocation. 
3. Account~ng, prediction, and decision models 
are analytically distinct elements of decision 
processes. This ass.umption results from acceptance 
of the paradigm of the 1971 AAA Committee on 
Theory Construction. The precise nature of these 
three models becomes clear upon coordination of 
the committee's paradigm with the features of 
rational decision processes as set forth in the 
theory of action. 
4. Accounting models function in both planning 
and control. The planning function of accounting 
involves efferent information channels, those 
which cause action on the environment; the control 
function of accounting involves afferent infor-
mation channels, those which provide information 
about the environment. 
5. Efferent channels operate in light of 
actor-comple~e decision processes; afferent 
channels operate in light of actor-incomplete 
decision processes. An actor-complete decision 
process is a situation wherein all currently 
existing conditions are either included in one or 
more true and relevant prediction models or are 
ruled irrelevant. Relevant prediction models 
specify the actions necessary to bring about the 
outcomes cathected by the actor. Moreover, the 
actor must choose according to his values. It 
is assumed that prediction-model insufficiency 
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is the source of afferent-channel incompleteness. 
The accounting function of control is to operate 
with afferent channels in order to eliminate this 
incompleteness. 
Method of Analysis 
Semiotics is the method of analysis used in this 
research. This technique involves the analysis of syn-
tactic, sem~ntic, and pragmatic aspects of knowledge or 
information. Syntax involves relations among language 
signs; semanticsinvolves the relation of language ex-
pressions to the empirical objects or operations designated 
by those expressions; pragmatics involves the relation of 
language expressions to users. 
Syntactical analysis is. the study of formal logic, 
i.e., operations on marks to form expressions and oper-
ations on expressions to form new expressions. Examples 
of expressions are sentences in English and algebraic 
equations in mathematics. In a "rationally constructed" 
language, one which has stated rules for all syntactical 
and semantical operations, the following syntactical rules 
will obtain: (l) rules specifying allowable marks, (2) 
rules of formation, specifying allowable combinations of 
marks in the formation of expressions, and (3) rules of 
transformation, specifying ways that expressions can be 
transformed into other expressions~ 
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Semantical analysis is the study of the meaning of 
language expressions. In a rationally constructed language 
the following semantical rules will obtain: (1) rules of 
designation, specifying what empirical objects or operations 
are referred to by expressions, (2) rules of truth, specify-
ing the conditions under which a sentence may be held out 
as true, and (3) rules of ranges, specifying when a sentence 
may be held out as holding in a particular "state 
description." 
Two important semantical concepts, intension and 
extension, must be understood, since aconclusion of this 
research rests on those concepts. Moreover, to understand 
those concepts, one must understand the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic sentences. These concepts are 
reviewed here. 
If syntactical and semantical rules alone are suf-
ficient to demonstrate that a sentence is true, then that 
sentence is analytic; however, if extralinguistic investi-
gations are required to demonstrate this truth, then that 
sentence is synthetic. Avoiding technical complications, 
the distinction is as follows: A sentence will be known to 
be.true without empirical investigation only if that 
sentence holds in all state descriptions, since one of the 
state descriptions must be true. Such a sentence is 
analytic--true on the basis of accepted semantical and syn-
tactical rules. All other sentences are synthetic, i.e., 
have a truth dependent upon correspondence with the facts 
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which can be discovered only through empirical investi-
gation. Moreover, two sentences are logically equivalent 
only if their mutual implication is analytic; two sentences 
are factually equivalent if their mutual implication can be 
discovered only through empirical investigation. 
Next consider the concepts of intension and extension.-
Intension involves the meaning of sentences; extension 
refers to the scope of predication and the related corre-
spondence with empirical facts (truth). Two sentences have 
the same intension if they are logically equivalent; two 
sentences have the same extension if they are equivalent. 
(Notice that, without modification, "equivalence" can refer 
to either logical or factual equivalence.) It follows that 
logically equivalent sentences are always factually equiva-
lent. But, factually equivalent sentences are not 
necessarily logically equivalent. In other words, two 
sentences with the same intensions have the same extension, 
i.e., the sentences refer to identical classes and have the 
same truth value. On the other hand, two sentences with 
the same extension do not necessarily have the same 
intension or meaning. 
In short, factually equivalent sentences may or may 
not have the same meaning. This leads one to the propo-
sition that the truth of any sentence can only be known if 
a semantical system is referenced when making such a 
determination. The truth of a statement is necessarily 
conditional upon a particular semantical system's specified 
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intensions. Thus for one to legitimately specify a 
statement as empirically correct, it is necessary for that 
individual to s~ecify the semantical system which is 
referenced. This conclusion is used later when the re-
quirements of an accounting system are developed. 
Summary of Analysis 
Coordinatj_on of the Concept of Rational 
Actions and 1971 Committee's Paradigm 
The purpose of explicating the concept of rational 
action and coordinating this with the committee's paradigm 
is to distinguish clearly among accounting, prediction, and 
decision models and to specify clearly the accounting 
function which interests this research. Since accounting 
functions to aid decisions by a rational actor, the 
necessity of explicating the concept of rational action and 
distinguj_shing among accounting, prediction, and decision 
models is patent. 
Action, the attempt to attain goals within a situation, 
involves three elements--the actor, the situation, and the 
orientation of the actor to the situation. Actors can be 
viewed as p~rsonality systems or social systems and as 
either the subject or object of action. This research deals 
with the subject-actor as a personality system. 
The situation, that part of the world which the actor 
takes into account, is comprised of objects. These objects 
may be social or nonsocial, instrumental or conditional. 
Nonsocial objects may be further classified as either 
physical or cultural. 
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Both physical and cultural objects can be transmitted 
from one actor to another. Transmitting physical objects 
results in change of possession. Transmitting cultural 
objects, or symbols, results in change of possession and 
also a way of acting, since culture is a way of orienting 
or acting. 
· Instrumental objects are those which the actor controls 
or uses in bringing about desired ends; conditional objects 
are those which provide constraints within which the actor 
operates. Accounting statements are viewed as cultural, 
instrumental objects which transmit knowledge to actors. 
In other words, accounting is analyzed in its function of 
providing actors with new cognitive orientations towards 
objects. 
Orientation, the actor's relations-to-objects, has 
three elements--cognition or knowin& cathexis or wanting, 
and evaluation or choosing. Any action involves these 
three elements.· In other words, an actor's orientation to 
the object world requires cognitive processes, which yield 
knowledge of the object world; cathectic processes, which 
yield a desire for a new or maintained relationship with 
those objects; and evaluative processes, which yield choice 
among potential means and goals. Notice that under this 
paradigm of choice there is initially a mapping of available 
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knowledge about relationships among objects onto the actor's 
cathected, personal relations-to-objectso This is labeled 
cathectic-cognitive orientation. Then, there is choice 
among the cathectic-cognitive discriminations. This is 
labeled evaluation; it involves choice among various means 
and resulting outcomes. 
Implicit in the above discussion of the actor's process 
of orientation to the object world is (l) choice among 
competing knowledge claims if competing claims have pre-
sented themselves, (2) assessment of an action's grati-
ficatory significance, viewed in isolation from other 
actions, and (3) assessment of the importance of various 
plans (action-combinations) from the point of view of the 
system as a whole. ·The standards or values involved in 
each of these three choices are cognitive, appreciative, 
and moral, respectively. These standards manifest them-
selves as consistent patterns of relationship between the 
actor and the object w.orld. The rational actor is posited 
as one who holds cognitive standards as primary with 
respect to performance-perceived instrumental objects and 
holds appreciative standards as primary with respect to 
quality-perceived goal objects. 
At this point the 1971 Committee's paradigm of the 
decision process is briefly reviewed. Then, that paradigm 
is coordinated with the concept of rational action. The 
committee identified three elements of decision processes--
accounting, prediction, and decision models. Accounting 
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models interpret observations on the empirical world and 
input this data to prediction models. The output of 
prediction models is input to a decision model, resulting 
in the choice of a plan of action. 
Coordination of the committee's paradigm and the 
concept of rational action follows. Prediction models are 
viewed as means of mapping instrumental objects onto goal 
objects. Prediction models allow the actor to achieve the 
cognitive aspect of cathectic-cognitive discrimination. 
It is assumed that goals are specified, i.e., that cathectic 
discrimination is achieved prior to operation of prediction 
models. (More precisely, it must be stated that only 
cognitive aspects of cathectic-cognitive discrimination are 
examined, since the two aspects are interdependent. See 
Chapter III, pp.·53-54 for a fuller. discussion.) 
Decision models are means of evaluation of alternative 
courses of action that are determined through the operation 
of prediction models. Prediction models specify various 
mean-goal packages (actions) available to the actor. The 
decision model is a model of choice among alternative 
course of action. 
Accounting models provjde empirical observations as 
input to prediction models. Thus, accounting models can 
be viewed as the semantical system of prediction models 
or, more precisely, as making representations of empirical 
observations in a manner consistent with the semantical 
system of prediction models. 
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Semiotic Analysis of Accounting Explanation 
The accounting model functions to aid rational 
(reasoned) action by providing input to prediction models 
which in turn provide input to decision models. This 
section reviews the syntactical and semantical analysis of 
accounting explanation, a concept that includes selection 
of prediction-model-relevant empirical events or objects, 
symbolic representation (classification and measurement) of 
selected events and objects, and generation of predictions 
in decision-model-relevant form. 
Accounting explanation is viewed as deductive in 
logical form. A completely specified deductive system of 
explanation will have the following syntactical rules: 
1. Rules of enumeration and classification--
These rules specify allowable signs of the 
language and classify those signs as logical 
or descriptive. 
2o Rules of formation--These rules specify 
the ways signs of the language can be combined 
to form sentences. 
3. Rules of transformation--These rules specify 
allowable (logical) transformations of sentences 
into other sentences. 
In addition to the above syntactical rules, there must 
be a semantical system in order for the deductive system to 
receive interpretation. The necessary rules are as 
follows: (1) rules of designation, (2) rules of truth, 
rules of ranges, and (4) rules of correspondence. Rules 
of designation specify what is referred to by descriptj_ve 
signs. Rules of truth and ranges operate to specify which 
sentences are analytic and which are synthetic. These 
rules have been reviewed in this summary. 
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Rules of correspondence connect descriptive sentences 
of the deductive system with empirical (observational or 
operational) sentences. These rules of correspondence 
have the characteristic of allowing both implication from 
the deductive system to observational sentences and also 
inference from observational sentences to descriptive 
sentences of the deductive system. 
The coordination of the concept of rational action 
and the committee's concept of accounting, prediction, 
and decision models leads to the previously described con-
cept of accounting explanation. Using the semiotic method 
of analysis, (deductive) accounting explanation, in its 
simplest form, has the function and related logical form, 
as displayed in Table VIII. 
In other words, the accounting model generates 
two classes of statements in the process of accounting 
explanation. The first type, the description of exist-
ing initial conditions, allows prediction of relevant 
means and outcomes. The second type, the representation 
of alternative mean-goal packages, allows the actor to 
evaluate those mean-goal alternatives. Prediction models 
are crucial links between these two types of statements. 
An important semantical requirement is that 
accounting statements provide semantically true represen-
tations. The dimensions represented, whether for the 
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purpose of prediction or decision model input, must be 
consistent with, or transformable to, the dimensions speci-
fied by the related semantical system. Basically, the 
reasoning for this conclusion is as follows. An individual 
cannot specify a statement as empirically true unless some 
meaning or intension is specified; otherwise, multiple in-
tensions will generally lead to multiple extension. (See 
pp. 160~161 of this chapter for elaboration.) Semantical 
systems specify those intensions and link these meanings to 
observables ·(i.e., objective, evj_dential matter). Thus, 
accounting statements can be held out as correct only if 
some semantical system is specified. 
TABLE. VIII 
THE LOGICAL FORM AND COGNITIVE FUNCTION 
OF ACCOUNTING EXPLANATION 
Element of Accounting 
Explanation 
Accounting Model 
Prediction Model 
Prediction Model 
Accounting Model 
Cognitive Function 
Served 
Determination of 
existing initial 
conditions 
Determination of 
means available 
Determination of 
possible outcomes 
Representation of 
alternative mean-
outcome packages 
in decision-model 
relevant form 
Logical Form 
(or Symbolic 
Representation) 
ci 
If ci, then M. J 
If ci and Mj, 
then ok 
Ml 01 
M2 02 
M 0 
n n 
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The Control Function of Accounting 
When discussing the control function of accounting, 
it is convenient to eliminate the analytical distinction 
between prediction and decision models. Henceforth, the 
term "decision model" is used to include the concepts of 
prediction and decision models as used previously. (See 
Chapter V, pp. 123-124 for a fuller discussion.) Nonethe-
less, accounting models provide a link between deductive 
models (decision models in this context) and empirical 
observations. 
Previously, it has been assumed that decision models 
were completely specified, i.e., that decision and account-
ing models were sufficient for a cognitively unhindered 
choice of actions. This sort of complete decision process 
allows each existing initial· condition to be ruled as 
either relevant or irrelevant. The control function of 
accounting is characterized as operating under the con-
straint of an incomplete decision process. Specifically, 
it is assumed that the predictive function of the decision 
process is cognitively insufficient relative to observed 
deviations from the "rational action path," the course of 
action decided upon during the planning stage. Of course, 
it could be argued that there is never a complete (cogni-
tively unhindered) decision process. Under this clearly 
acceptable view, this section of the research is seen as a 
critical examination of a crucial assumption of the 
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foregoing analysis. 
Under a complete decision process, adequate expla-
nation must adhere to the following principles: 
1. The explanans (the statements of initial 
conditions and general laws) must allow deduction 
of the explanandum (the predicted outcomes 
desired by the actor, or subsequent deviations 
from the rational action path). 
2. There must be general laws and these must be 
required for derivation of the explanandum. 
In the context of this research, general laws 
are decision models, broadly interpreted. 
3. The explanans must have empirical content. 
This condition is required if some empirical 
phenomenon is being explained. 
4. The explanans, both the general laws and the 
inputs from the accounting system, must be true. 
Condition (1) simply requires logical validity. It 
emphasi~es the necessity of specified syntactical rules. 
Condition (3) requires "verifiability in principle." 
The necessity of objective, verifiable evidence is 
emphasized. (See Chapter II, pp. 37-38 for elaboration.) 
This condition is accepted insofar as accounting models 
are concerned with verifiable, empirical statements. 
Condition (4) requires that general laws and observational 
statements be empirically verified. This condition em-
ph~sizes the necessity of specified semantical rules. 
The requirement of semantical truth has been shown to be 
necessary for accounting statements. Moreover, the pre-
dictive function of decision processes require verified 
prediction models. In other words, accounting statements 
must be consistent with verified prediction models in order 
for the actor to make cognitively unhindered evaluations 
of alternative actions. Thus, conditions (1), (3), and 
(4) are necessary for adequate accounting explanation. 
The absence of condition (2), however, is precisely 
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the feature of decision processes that makes control 
explanations necessary. (See Chapter V, pp. 124-132 for an· 
extended discussion.) If relevant general laws are known, 
then one can plan adequately and completely. (The syn-
tactical and semantical requirements of accounting expla-
nation under these circumstances have been reviewed in the 
immediately preceeding section.) But, for a situation to be 
11 out of control 11 implies that either the predictive or 
evaluative aspect of the decision process is incomplete. 
It is asswned that evaluative aspects are sufficient; thus, 
predictive models are insufficient. In other words, 
certain relevant general laws are unspecified and control 
explanations are necessary. 
A fundamental question, then, is how unknown general 
laws can obtain and thus make control explanations adequate. 
Or, are such laws unnecessary? The answers to these 
questions are reasoned as follows. Any explanation must be 
a generalization to some degree. The alternative to 11 shear-
ing off 11 certain features of the situation is to provide 
the decision maker with an infinite data set. The latter 
alternative is clearly not feasible. Thus, selectivity is 
necessary; certain aspects of an event or state of affairs 
must be reported and all others must be left unreported. 
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This cannot be avoided. 
The question that arises is what tool is to be used 
to make that selection. That question can be answered only 
with respect to completed explanation as follows. The 
rational actor requires predictions. As a result, the com-
pleted explanation, i.e., the basis for the reported 
information, must be general laws of predictive force. 
This requirement provides the accountant with a tool of 
selection that avoids an infinite data set and provides 
useful information to the decision maker. The only feasible 
alternative is an arbitrarily limited data set. 
But this conclusion points to a fundamental, un-
answered question--How are these general laws discovered? 
In turn, this question brings to light the singular feature 
of accounting models, viz., the characterization of 
accounting models as functioning in a capacity that is 
larger and more complex than merely operating according to 
some decision-model-specified semantical system. Instead 
an accounting model must embrace rules that allow inference 
from observation to general laws. The nature of this model 
is problematic. 
Summary of Analysis and Results 
Analysis 
This research held out as its first task the expli-
cation of the concepts of accounting, prediction, and 
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decision models and the definition of accounting's infor-
mative function. In other words an analytical distinction 
was drawn among accounting, prediction, and decision models. 
This, in turn, allowed precise definition of accounting 
explanation which is requisite to accounting's informative 
function. 
This first task was accomplished by coordinating the 
paradigm of the 1971 AAA Committee on Accounting Theory 
Construction with the concept of rational action. The 
Committee's paradigm specified the cognitive function of 
accounting, prediction, and decision models, while the 
theory of action provided a basis for defining rational 
action and thereby specifying the cognitive requirements 
of rational action. A coordination of the two paradigms 
allowed explication of the informative function of each 
of the three models. 
The second task was to identify the necessary re-
quirements of accounting explanation. This task was 
accomplished by examining the cognitive function of each of 
the three elements of the decision process in the context 
of adequation explanationo The analysis adopted certain 
teGhniques of semiotic analysis. Specifically, the syn-
tactical and semantical requireme0ts of adequate explanation 
were identified, leading to an identification of the 
requirements of accounting explanation. In short, the 
logical form, function, and requirements of each of the 
three elements of the decision process were identified and 
the function and requirements of accounting models, the 
means of linking explanatory systems to observables, were 
identified. 
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The third task was to extend the analysis to the 
control, as opposed to the planning, function of accounting 
explanation. This was accomplished by first distinguishing 
planning and control. This last analysis gives insight to 
the problematic nature of accounting models. 
Results 
The first primary result of this research resulted 
from the first two tasks of this study. First, the 1971 
Committee's paradigm of accounting, prediction and decision 
models and the concept of rational action were coordinated, 
leading to an explication of those three elements of the 
decision process and to a specification of each element's 
cognitive function. Also, the meaning of accounting 
explanation was made clear. Then, adopting the logical 
empiricists' model of deductive explanation, the logical 
form and requirements of each element of accounting expla-
nation was specified. Finally, given the analytical 
distinction of accounting, prediction, and decision models~ 
accounting models were interpreted as necessarily se~ 
mantical-system-consistent. Accounting models are the means 
of linking explanatory systems to observables. The re,-
quirements of such a model implicitly encompass all 
requirements of the explanatory system as a whole. 
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Of course, it can be argued that the distinction 
drawn among accounting, prediction, and decision models 
does not in fact hold. Nonetheless, the analytical dis-
tinction holds and provides useful insight. In sum, 
accounting explanation encompasses all cognitive aspects of 
the decision process up to final choice by the actor. The . 
logical form, function, and requirement of the elements 
of that explanation have been identified. In particular, 
accounting models were seen as directly involving se-
mantical systems that are implicit in objective, verifiable 
explanatory systems. 
The foregoing results are conclusions drawn from an 
analysis of accounting explanation in the context of fully 
articulated deductive systems. A "complete" decision 
process, as defined earlier, was examined. In other words, 
the first section of this research examines accounting 
models in the context of planning. But, the second section 
examines accounting mo.del s in the context· of control. How-
ever, before this can be accomplished, the distinction 
between planning and control must be drawn. In particular, 
the characterization of planning as operating in light of 
a complete decision process must be defended. The clear 
distinction drawn between planning and control, and the 
effect of this distinction on the nature of accounting 
models constitute the other primary results of this 
research. 
Planning involves providing explanations that effect 
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action. Control involves feedback of results of action for 
purposes of replanning. The need for feedback information 
can result from actions that deviated from the plan or 
original plans that are wrong. If actions deviate from a 
correct plan, correction of actions is simply required. If 
the means of correcting the action is known then there is 
no replanning--the original plan will suffice. But if the 
original plan is wrong, or if the means of correcting 
actions are unknown, then replanning is necessary. 
The question can be raised--What is a correct plan? 
A correct plan appears impossible to define. But a com-
plete system of explanation can be defined as a state of 
affairs wherein all currently existing conditions are 
either included in one or more true and relevant prediction 
models or are ruled irrelevant. Action, the result of 
planning, assumes such a complete system. If the impact 
of some current condition is not known to be relevant or 
irrelevant, the actor must act as if it is irrelevant. 
But control implies a deviation that requires replanning, 
i.e., some irrelevant factor is found to be, in fact, rele-
vant for some reason. The purpose of control is to discover 
the reason, to replan. If the reader will now read the 
preceeding paragraph by replacing the word "right" with 
"complete" and the word "wrong" with" incomplete," the 
argument for the planning and control distinction.will be 
complete. 
The distinction between planning and control leads to 
a final and fundamental result of this research. Control 
requires discovery of causes of deviations from planned 
outcomes such that corrections are possible. Corrections 
are possible only if prediction models can be discovered. 
Thus, accounting models must allow inference from obser-
vations to prediction models (general laws). In sum, 
accounting models are much more complex than is implied 
by ·those who maintain that accounting could solve its 
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data selection problem if the prediction models used by 
decision makers were known. Even if that were known, there 
is the strong possibility of incomplete decision processes 
which require accounting to fulfill a control function. 
Clearly, research into the nature of this control model 
would provide fundamental insight into the problems of 
accounting. This presents an avenue for further research, 
while the present study provides a tool or method useful 
in such research. 
Extensions 
The final section of this study provides a number of 
extensions, all of which have been mentioned in passing at 
convenient points. Most, if not all, of these comments 
stem from the view of accounting as an inherent part of 
explanatory systems. This view quite naturally recognizes 
accounting systems as subject to all requirements of an 
objective, verifiable explanatory system. 
In Chapter II, it was pointed out that the concept of 
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multiple-purpose accounting statements is potentially in-
consistent with the goal of empirically correct accounting 
statements, unless accounting systems are viewed as in-
volving some immediate semantical system. The reasoning 
is as follows. Semantical systems specify meaning or 
intension. And as the number of interpretations of any 
statement increases, so do the extensions. As a result, 
the likelihood of any statement being true relative to a:j_l 
interpretations diminishes as the number of semantical 
systems increase. Moreover, the concept of general purpose 
financial ~tatements implies multiple semantical systems, 
one for each class of usero Thus, if accounting statements 
are to be held out as empirically true propositions prior 
to transmittal, it is necessary to specify the related 
semantical system prior to transmittal. Finally, it can 
be noted that the present approach to "standard setting" 
in financial accounting appears to be an attempt to 
specify a single semanti_cal system. While the approach 
receives various criticisms, it is not entirely clear what 
viable alternatives are available. , If information were 
generated through a "free" market system with participants 
who demanded verified information, the problem of semantical 
system specification remains. In short, "standard setting" 
would presumably be present, whether imposed by formally 
established, quasi-governmental bodies or by "consumers." 
In either event, costs of standard setting are imposed, and 
the relative efficiency of the two means of setting 
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standards seems to be an open question. 
Two additional points deserve elaboration. The first 
concerns the question of "truth in accounting," while the 
second involves the "dual purposiveness" of accounting. As 
will be shown, the two questions are closely intertwined. 
The question of truth in accounting has generated a 
good deal of argument among accountants. The controversy 
revolves around whether accounting statements must be 
"true." While the precise meaning of truth appears to be 
unspecified~ those supporting "truth in accounting" tend 
to support proposals that result in measurement of "true 
income," a concept of well-offness of the measure entity. 
If that entity begins and ends some period of time at the 
same level of well-offness, then no income was generated; 
and, so forth. It can be fairly said that issues of income 
measurement absorb a great deal of time of accountants. 
On the other side are those accountants, especially 
those interested in "information economics," who maintain 
that accounting information, like any other economic good, 
does not necessarily have anything to do with truth but 
rather with satisfaction of the consumer. 
As it stands, this controversy appears, and probably 
is, irresolvable. As a result, a further examination in the 
context developed in this research is provided. Within the 
paradigm set forth here, actors are viewed as using infor-
mation in two ways--the predictive and the evaluative. This 
situation, described as the "dual purposiveness" of 
accounting statements, clearly reveals the nature of the 
controversy. 
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Those who view accounting questions in the context of 
11 economic good 11 questions are wont to remark that, given 
equal cost, the solution to the question should be in favor 
of that which yields a more finezydiscriminated object 
world. Those who advocate true income approaches, mean-
while, will decide the question according to a standard of 
nearness to some ideal income construct. Within the 
paradigm of this research, an accounting information 
question is solvable only by reference to prediction and 
decision models, i.e., by reference to known and relevant 
ways to discriminate the object world. The relevant 
dimensions are specified by the semantical systems encom-
passed by prediction and decision models used by the 
rational subject-actor. 
The controversy is placed in perspective as follows: 
The 11 true income" accoun~ants, if they view accounting 
statements as useful to a rational actor, must admit that 
the measurement of the success of an actor/entity during 
some period allows the determination of future actions. 
Their approach is to define success along a scale called 
11 income 11 which is, under the paradigm of this research, a 
measurement along some evaluative dimensions. But, accord-
ing to the results of this research, in order for such a 
measurement to provide information useful for choice among 
future alternatives, the objects represented must first be 
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discriminated along prediction-model relevant dimensions 
and then along evaluative dimensions. Thus, it follows 
that true income accountants (and probably many more) 
view accounting information as unique in that it represents 
states of affairs along evaluative dimensions which are 
1 als~_useful for predictive purposes. 
On the other hand, the "information economics" ac-
countants view accounting statements as partitioning the 
object world along certain unspecified dimensions. And 
since this discrimination is not restricted in any way, 
it follows that alternative discriminations are often non-
comparable along a scale of "degree of information . 11 
More specifically, the issue dealt with is choice among 
alternative accounting information packages (goods) which 
partition the object world in different ways. But, 
according to the paradigm set forth here, the actor cannot 
choose without some information of a predictive and evalu-
ative nature. Thus, the approach of the information 
economists involves a regress from choices of information 
system users to choices of information systems selectors or 
evaluators. In order to choose among accounting systems, 
the subject-actor (information system evaluator) must be 
able to discriminate among those systems. The decision 
process, if rational, demands predictive and evaluative 
1Exactly this approach is taken by Lawrence Revsine, 
Replacement Cost Accounting (Englewood Cliffs, 1973). 
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discrimination, including knowledge of the way each alter-
native system partitions the object world, the actions of 
object-actors (information system users) upon receipt of 
messages from the alternative systems, and so forth. 
Indeed, a similar problem was encountered in this research. 
As a result, it was initially assumed that the devices of 
cognitive discrimination were available, i.e., prediction 
and decision models were given. 
Thus, to avoid infinite regress, the information 
economists must admit of devices specifying relevant 
dimensions of the object world. But, in that case, if they 
view accounting information as a cognitive tool that is'to 
be useful to a rational subject-actor, it follows that 
semantical truth is a necessary requirement of accounting 
information, whether "accounting information" is 
interpreted as information necessary to choose information 
systems or information resulting from such systems. 
· In summary, then,· b.oth parties to the controversy 
appear to be committed to the necessity of truth, provided 
that usefulness to a rational actor as subject is main-
tained as the purpose of accounting information. The 
apparent disagreement is simply one of emphasis. The infor-
mation economists emphasize the economic aspects of choice 
among information packages. But this in itself implies 
cognitive discrimination along predictive and evaluative 
dimensions and, thus, the necessity of semantical truth. 
The "true income" accountants emphasize accounting 
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information as measurement along predictive-evaluative 
dimensions and must also accept the necessity of semantical 
truth. 
Finally, it should be noted that the above 11 reso-
lution11 of the controversy holds only with respect to 
rational subject-actors. For example, suppose that some 
accounting information evaluator (the subject-actor) is 
choosing among accounting information packages for the 
purpose of transmission to some user (the object-actor). 
If the subject-actor is rational then his choice process 
will be as explicated in this research. The information 
package chosen will depend on the subject-actor's pre-
diction and decision models. And for the subject-actor, 
empirical validity of the information used is necessary for 
a cognitively unhindered decision process. In other words, 
semantical truth is necessary. However, with respect to 
the object-actor no such assertions are possible unless 
that actor is characteri~ed according to the pattern-
variables of Chapter III. In any event, when one turns to 
the object actor's choice process from his point of view, 
that actor, by definition, becomes a subject-actor. In 
short, without pattern-variable characterizations of the 
user of accounting information, no statements about the 
requirements of accounting information are possible. 
A third extension involves the interpretation of the 
balance sheet. Accounting statements function to provide 
knowledge of existing initial conditions in prediction-
model-relevant form and representations of alternative 
means-outcome packages in decision-model-relevant form. 
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As popularly interpreted, the balance sheet is recognized 
as a statement of financial condition. The basic idea is 
that the balance sheet provides a statement of the con-
dition of a firm at some point in time. Thus, the implied 
purpose of the balance sheet appears to be to provide 
information as to the existing initial condition for 
purposes of prediction. As a result, it is essential that 
those statements are identified with a semantical system 
that specifies relevant conditions. 
A final extension involves a case against the matching 
concept at a fundamental level. This research accepts a 
means-goal paradigm of action, which results in viewing 
accounting as providing statements for purposes of pre-
diction and evaluation. Prediction ultimately results in 
alternative instrumental plans of action; there is a listing 
of alternative instrumental actions and resulting outcomes. 
Evaluation involves choice among those alternatives. How-
ever, there is not necessarily an attaching of "costs" to 
means and "benefits" to outcomes. In other words, the 
distinction between prediction and evaluation is most 
fruitfully viewed as two aspects qf one problem. Prediction 
involves the determination of the impact of alternative 
actions on the state of affairs, while evaluation involves 
choice among those alternative actions given the resulting 
impact. Choice is not necessarily constrained by a 
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requirement that alternative actions (means) are negative 
aspects and that the new states of affairs (outcomes) 
resulting from those actions are positive aspects. While 
the means-outcome distinction is beneficial for purposes 
of prediction, evaluation of alternatives may be along 
dimensions that cut across the previous means-outcome 
distinction. 
In short, it is a truism that the actor will choose 
the means-outcome package that provides the greatest net 
benefit. But, at the point of evaluation, the alternative 
packages are the objects of choice; it is not necessarily 
a situation of sacrificing means to ach~eve outcomes. 
However, the concept of matching, as put forth by many, 
appears to embrace the concept of matching costs of sacri-
fices against the benefits achieved by that sacrifice. 
Moreover, the objects of sacrifice and objects of benefit 
are determined prior to all actions. In other words, the 
matching concept implies the identification of the objects 
of sacrifice (means) and objects of benefit (goals), 
where costs attach to the means and benefits attach to the 
goals. For example, examine the following quotation from 
a popular accounting text: 
The basic principle is to match expenses with 
revenues; 'let the expenses follow the revenue.' 
Thus, expenses should be recognized not when 
wages are paid or necessarily when work is· 
performed but when that work actually makes its 
contribution to revenue •••• The matching 
principle thus dictates that efforts (expenses) 
be matched with accomplishments (revenue) if 
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feasible. 2 
The weakness of this concept is now apparent. Objects 
of sacrifice are specified prior to all actions and only 
negative aspects (costs) are identified with those actions; 
objects of benefit are identified prior to all actions and 
only positive aspects (revenues) are identified with those 
actions. This eliminates the possibility of positive 
aspects of instrumental actions and negative aspects of the 
resulting outcomes. In other words, there is an attaching 
of costs to.means and benefits to outcomes, where means 
and outcomes are specified prior to action. Evaluation, 
it has been argued, is more fruitfully viewed as an aspect 
of the choice process that is unconstrained by the prior 
predictive aspect. At point of evaluation, the means-
outcome distinction is unnecessary. 
The much stronger concept provided in this research 
recognizes accounting systems as encompassing immediate 
semantical systems. Th~s concept of acco0nting emphasizes 
the importance of the informative function and, as shown 
in this section, provides a useful tool for examining 
various accounting issues, including income measurement. 
2 Donald E. Kieso and Jerry J. Weygandt, Intermediate 
Accounting, 2nd ed. (New York, 1977), p. 31 
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